Socially Responsible Globalization. A challenge for the European Union by unknown
  
Publications 1999:26 
 
Socially responsible globalization: a 
challenge for the European Union 
 
 
 
 
By Bob Deacon 
  
 
 
 
 
Preface 
 
 
The strengthening of the social dimension of the European Union is a challenging 
and multi-dimensional project. European integration is not a separate process but a 
part of globalization, and thus, Europe has to clarify its role at the global level.   
 
The Finnish Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has commissioned many books on 
the future of European social policy. One of them is Pathways for Social Protection in 
Europe (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. Publications 1998:13) compiled by the 
European Institute of Social Security. This publication has launched seven pathways 
on how to develop the European social policy model. These seven pathways concern 
the internal development of the EU. However, Europe also has a crucial role to play 
as a global actor and not only of economic significance but also of social significance.  
 
The idea of this discussion paper is to bring up ideas on how the European union 
could promote socially responsible globalization. This book has been written by Mr 
Bob Deacon, professor of Social Policy at the University of Sheffield, UK, with the 
assistance of Morgan Killick. Professor Deacon is also director of the Globalism and 
Social Policy programme. Professor Deacon would like to put forward the 
globalising of social rights, put social policy on the development agenda and inject 
social concerns into the global economy. These ideas are very challenging and it is 
not difficult to predict that they will meet with some criticism. However, these ideas 
clearly show, that the mechanisms, through which this kind of interest in socially 
responsible globalism can be expressed, need more of our attention at the European 
level. 
 
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not 
represent the views of the Ministry. The Ministry, however, hopes that this book can 
contribute to the discussions on economically and socially balanced European and 
global development. 
 
 
Helsinki, November 1999 
 
 
Kari Välimäki 
Director-General  
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SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE GLOBALIZATION 
A CHALLENGE FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 
This report’s focus is on the contribution that the EU is and could be making to advance 
the social welfare of citizens of the world. It is being written to coincide with the Finnish 
Presidency of the European Union in the second half of 1999. When the world was 
divided between a ‘communist’ east and a capitalist west Finland played a significant 
role globally fostering understanding and rapprochement between the two worlds as 
well as advancing the cause of peace globally. Now that the issue is not communism 
versus capitalism but what kind of global capitalism Finland can be again expected to 
play a role because of the positive part that its welfare state, along with those of Nordic 
countries generally, has played in meeting the needs of their citizens. Equally the high 
contribution of the Nordic countries to international development assistance gives them 
as a group the right to speak about how to improve the world in terms of social well-
being. A key question for Finland is how to advance their potential contribution to global 
social justice through their membership of the European union. It is this concern that lies 
at the heart of the publication. 
  In his book THE GLOBAL TRAP H.P Martin et. al. (1997) argued that if the 
dangers of global economic liberalisation are to be avoided then; 
 
The countries of Europe can and must start acting together against this danger 
(of a liberalizing globalization), but the solution does not lie in opposing a 
Fortress Europe to the coming Fortress America ... the aim would be to counter 
destructive ... neo-liberalism with a potent and viable European alternative ... in 
the unfettered global capitalism only a united Europe could push through new 
rules providing for a greater social balance and ecological restructuring ...  A 
European Union truly worthy of the name could insist that the tax havens be 
cleared, demand the enforcement of minimum social and ecological standards, 
or raise a turnover tax on the capital and currency trade. 
 
It is this view that also inspires the writing of this small booklet. It follows on from the 
previous booklet in this series entitled Pathways for Social Protection in Europe (Pieters 
and Nickless 1998) which was concerned to review the steps that might be taken within 
the EU to advance the social welfare of EU citizens. Our canvass is larger but no less 
important. 
In fact the heyday of global neo-liberalism about which Martin was warning 
may have passed. The shortcomings of unregulated global financial markets are evident 
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for all to see. A global debate has begun in earnest within and between the major formal 
international organisations and an emerging global civil society as to the best way to 
move to a more socially responsible globalization. (Deacon 1999; Deacon 1999a). A few 
examples of this discussion can be noted here: 
 
i) The Human Resources Network inside the World Bank continues to debate the 
relative merits of European universalistic and state approaches to social policy 
compared with American targeted and privatised approaches.  
 
ii) The IMF recently convened a conference questioning the long held assumption 
that inequality and growth had to be traded against each other and asked 
rather whether there was a minimum degree of equity within all countries 
upon which we could agree and work for globally. 
 
iii) The focus of International Development Co-operation (Aid) upon the goal of 
eliminating the worst poverty through targeting by 2015 is also a step forward 
but does however hold the danger of cutting across in a way that is not helpful 
the view that universalistic policies can make the best contribution to social 
stability. 
 
iv) The UN summit on Social Development in 1995 committed world leaders to 
‘create an economic, political, cultural and legal environment that will enable 
people to achieve social development’. In the early stages of the preparation for 
the review in 2000 of progress in this direction a number of more concrete 
global reforms have been tabled by the UN social policy and social 
development secretariat. Among these are the ‘identification of effective forms 
of international co-operation and co-ordination of taxation policy between 
countries so as to contain tax competition’. However when we examine in 
more detail the role of the UN in this global debate it is possible to be struck by 
the fact that because some in the South are tempted by the short term 
comparative advantage of low labour and social standards the UN isn’t 
necessarily the ally of universalistic social protection policies. Attempts by the 
North to argue for common global labour and social standards are often 
perceived to be self interested attempts to protect the social welfare securities 
of people in developed countries from being undercut by competition from the 
south. This situation be-devilled the discussions in 1996 when attempts were 
made to establish social clauses in world trade agreements. 
 
Within this context of a global discourse concerning the future of welfare policy it is not 
surprising that from within Finland has emerged a body of writing which already 
advances the idea of nothing less than global social reformism (Patomäki 1999; Kiljunen 
1999). Heikki Patomäki (1999, 18, 21, 26) argues that  
 
‘it is in the real interests of the Nordics to struggle for changing the conditions 
which have made it so difficult to sustain social/democratic ideals ... this 
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process should at least be partially detached and freed from the notion of a 
sovereign state. Instead the focus should be on democratising and socialising 
world politics ... the neat model of inside progress and universal welfare-
combined with outside foreign policy ... presupposes a context that is not there 
anymore ... any meaningful Nordic emancipation must be connected to 
regional and global social/democratic reforms ... and last but not least, as the 
only universalist and somewhat representative organisation, the United 
Nations should be the focal point of global socialdemocratic reforms ... ’      
 
But the case for global social progress is not confined to contributions from the Nordic 
countries. For example the UK government, through the intervention of the Chancellor 
Gordon Brown, has made a significant contribution to the debate about how to regulate 
the global economy not only in terms of financial flows but also in terms of the social 
dimension of globalization. He has argued for a Global Social Policy Code. This would 
be a ‘code of global best practice in social policy which will apply for every country, will 
set minimum standards and will ensure that when the IMF and the World Bank help a 
country in trouble the agreed programme of reform will preserve investments in the 
social, education, and employment programmes which are essential for growth’ 
Moreover this code ‘should not be seen in narrow terms as merely the creation of social 
safety nets. We should see it as creating opportunities for all by investing more not less 
in education, employment and vital public services’. (Brown 1999.) 
At the same time within the context of its Presidency of the European Union 
Germany set out some of its thoughts on these issues as follows (Schroeder 1999); 
 
 ‘In Germany’s view an attempt should  ... be made to incorporate in the new World 
Trade agreement general social and environmental standards’; 
 ‘to the German government development policy translates into global structural 
policy designed to improve economic, social, ecological and political conditions in 
the developing world’; 
 ‘Faced with economic globalization the EU needs a policy which promotes 
strengthened international co-operation and the creation of a regulatory framework 
including ecological and social aspects for the world economy as a lasting 
development’; 
 ‘The German Presidency will initiate an EU charter of fundamental rights’  
 
Within this context of a sharpened global debate about what is to be done to make 
globalization socially responsible this booklet approaches the topic in the following way.  
 In chapter one we review the dangers of a neo-liberal globalization for social welfare 
north and south. 
 In chapter two we review briefly the steps that are currently being taken to shift the 
world from this scenario to a more socially responsible one. The case for a global 
social reformist project is set out.  
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 In the third chapter we review some of the initial responses of the EU and its member 
countries to the challenges of globalization and make an initial assessment of 
whether it is reasonable to expect that the EU as a body could make more concerted 
steps towards being a global player helping to shift the world towards a socially 
responsible globalization. Has it the capacity to do what Hans Peter Martin suggests? 
 Chapters four, five, and six review in turn the steps towards a socially responsible 
globalization in more detail and examine the track record of the EU in these matters. 
We cover how far the EU has or has not been a constructive ally in terms of   
a) Fostering a global set of human and social rights. (chapter 4) 
b) Setting global social targets and ensuring their achievement in the  
    context of international development co-operation. (chapter 5)  
c) Ensuring the social regulation of global financial processes in terms of  
    bilateral and international trade, financial flows and the behaviour of  
   Trans-National Corporations. (chapter 6) 
 In chapter seven we take stock of the achievements and shortcomings of the 
contribution of the EU so far to the goal of achieving a socially responsible 
globalization. A number of suggestions are made for how further steps might be 
taken at the level of the Commission, the Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Council and in terms of the Intergovernmental Process. 
 
A word of explanation is needed as to why this booklet about global social well-being is 
being written by a scholar of social policy and at the request of a Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health. It might have been expected that these matters were more the 
concern of scholars of development studies and affected the interests of Ministers of 
Overseas Development or Trade or Finance. The point is twofold. First Ministries of 
Social Policy within the EU have been concerned to improve EU social policy for the 
citizens of Europe but if this is their only concern they may either be unwitting 
accomplices to a European Social Protectionism seeking to defend the social privileges of 
a small part of the globe at the expense of the rest of humanity or will live to see these 
achievements swept away by the chill winds of a globalization driven by a particular 
economic liberal agenda. Second, if these scenarios are to be avoided, a more systematic 
policy coherence across traditional boundaries of Ministerial responsibility are needed. 
Ministers of International Development Co-operation need to think about how the social 
policies they advocate for the rest of the world impact back in a globalizing context on 
European Social Policy. Ministers of Trade need to be even more aware than they are of 
the impact of free trade and international investment on social policy. As pressure on 
labour taxes, for example, gets more intense Ministers of Finance need to reflect on how 
new global taxes can be levied to underpin social provision both within Europe and 
abroad. The concerns of European Ministries of Ministry of Social Affairs and Health do 
now have a global reach and a main focus of their activities must be to ensure there is 
policy coherence between them and other areas of government activity at the European 
and global level. If this does not happen we may see more of a process which has already 
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begun namely the making of social policy by default by other agencies whose first brief 
is not this business. The drift towards social policy being made by the WTO in dealings 
with trade Ministries, by the World Bank in dealings with Finance Ministries needs to be 
reversed. At the EU level it is hoped that this booklet will make a contribution in this 
regard. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE CHALLENGES OF A LIBERALISING GLOBALIZATION 
 
The process of globalization 
  
This is not the place to examine the nature and meaning of globalization in great depth. 
For those who need this we suggest you refer to the 1999 UNDP Human Development 
Report which is on Globalization and Human Development. For the purposes of this 
pamphlet we mean by globalization all of the following processes which have 
accelerated over the past twenty or so years: 
 Massively increased speculative flows of short term foreign investment based on 
currency trading; 
 Significantly increased longer term foreign direct investment; 
 Increased world trade with associated policies to reduce barriers to trade further; 
 Increased share of global production and trade associated with Trans National 
Corporations (TNCs); 
 Interconnectedness of production globally due in part to changes in the technology of 
production and servicing; 
 Increased movement of people for trade and for labour purposes; 
 The global reach of new forms of communication including TV and the internet. 
 
These processes and other associated phenomena have in turn lead to the emergence of a 
global civil society sharing a common political and cultural space. At the same time 
while economic activity has become more global and we have seen the birth of a global 
civil society global political institutions lag behind these developments and are to a large 
extent stuck in an earlier historic epoch of intergovernmentalism. 
 
The social consequences of globalization 
 
The liberalising globalization of the past decades have been shown to have a number of 
undesirable social consequences globally (UNDP 1999). These include 
 Increased inequality both within and between countries and increased 
impoverishment; 
 Increased vulnerability of people to social risks such as unemployment and crime; 
 Increased chances of exclusion of individuals, communities, countries and regions 
from the benefits of globalization. 
 
At the same time the processes of liberalising globalization may have damaged the 
capacity of governments to act in a socially compensatory way. In the past countries 
were used to implementing and benefiting from their own national policies. Even the 
more open economies felt they could manage their own destinies. Globalization may be 
changing this. In particular; 
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 Countries which pursue macroeconomic policies which include deficit spending are 
punished by currency speculators and the outflow of capital,  
 The taxation capabilities of countries are severely challenged by tax competition, tax 
havens, and transfer price mechanisms of multinational corporations. 
 Governments confront difficulties in pursuing microeconomic policies such as 
industrial strategies. Multi-national organisations such as the WTO are quick to 
remind governments of the limits of autonomy in this sphere. 
 Powerful TNCs bring capital, technology and management to their host country but 
this comes with a lack of accountability to the country within which they operate. 
 
All of this is happening while the social consequences of globalization generate the need 
for more not less measures of social protection. Inequality requires more social 
redistribution, vulnerability requires the strengthening of social rights and entitlements 
and systems of social protection, social exclusion creates the need for strategies of 
empowerment. 
One way to capture the impact of globalization on the capacity of more 
developed countries to juggle openness to globalization with a national social policy is to 
examine the impact of globalization on the diverse kinds of welfare states that are 
numbered among the OECD countries.  
 
Globalization  
 
 Sets Welfare States in competition with each other. This generates the danger of 
social dumping, deregulation and a race to the welfare bottom. There are, however, 
political choices available within each welfare state. Does it indeed cut expenditures 
and loosen labour and other regulations and pursue the race to the welfare bottom? 
Does it spend on certain aspects of social welfare to increase productivity and 
political and social stability in order to attract investment? Does it steer a third course 
and maintain all welfare expenditures funded in ways that do least damage to 
competitiveness? 
 
 Raises issues of social redistribution, social regulation, social empowerment to a 
regional and global level. As a result new supranational and global actors enter the 
picture and complicate the politics of welfare. These include Inter-governmental 
Organisations such as the Bretton Woods organisations, the UN family of agencies, 
the OECD etc., International Non Governmental Organisations, Transnational 
Corporations, Global Social Movements, and Transnational Policy Networks, 
Epistemic Communities, and Subcontracted Consultancy Companies. It is because of 
this that there have been calls to regulate some of the global actors and to reform the 
contribution of others to global social governance.   
 
 Generates a global discourse within and between global actors on the future of 
national and supranational social policy. In the emerging ‘complex multi-lateralism’ 
the future for social policy at both national and supranational level is being shaped 
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by a struggle between supranational organisations for the right to shape policy, and 
within and between supranational organisations for the content of social policy. 
Below we note for example how within this global discourse certain assumptions 
held by the IMF and the Bank about desirable social policy has steered countries to 
an unnecessary convergence in the direction of the residualisation and privatisation 
of social protection.    
 
 Creates a global market in welfare providers. The increased opportunity 
globalization generates for private providers of welfare services to become global and 
operate in many countries may contribute to the undermining of national social 
provision and national regulatory policies. It is clear that the international insurance 
market is waiting in the wings to sell its products to the less risky sections of the 
population in Europe if the pressures upon pay-roll taxes begins to create political 
alliances for reducing public pension commitments. Global markets in social care 
providers, health service providers (Koivusalo and Ollila 1997; WHO 1998), social 
assistance and welfare benefits providers (The Times, 30th April 1999) as well as 
education are active in Europe. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 
which had been drafted under OECD auspices (OECD 1998) would have made it 
much easier for such global providers to expand into new markets and countries and 
potentially undermine public welfare provision (Clarke and Barlow 1997). Its 
temporary derailing helped by an effective alliance of global NGOs using email and 
the web to track and challenge the discussions and raise concerns is an important 
indicator of how the politics of welfare has become global.  
 
 
Globalization and developed welfare states 
 
Within this context projections concerning the future impact of globalization on social 
policy in developed countries have ranged from those that prophet doom to those that 
are complacent. At one extreme Hans-Peter Martin (1997, 7) has written: 
 
In a global pincers movement, the new International of capital is turning whole 
countries and social orders upside down. On one front, it threatens to pull out 
altogether according to the circumstances of the hour, thus forcing massive tax 
reductions as well as subsidies running into billions of marks or the provision of 
cost- free infrastructure. If that doesn’t work, tax planning in the grand style can 
often help out: profits are revealed only in countries where the rate of taxation is 
really low. All round the world, the owners of capital and wealth are 
contributing less and less to the financing of public expenditure. On the other 
front, those who manage the global flows of capital are driving down the wage-
levels of their tax-paying employees. Wages as a share of national wealth are 
declining world-wide; no single nation is capable of resisting the pressure. The 
German model (will) be ‘well and truly thinned down’ by global competition. 
 
At the other extreme writing on the capacity of governments to promote social goals 
Frank Vandenbroucke (1998, 59) has concluded that, 
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Apart from the desirability of international economic co-operation and financial 
regulation ... the crucial constraints for successful egalitarian employment 
policies hinge (a) upon willingness to redistribute resources from rich (often 
high-skilled) to poor (often low-skilled) to finance targeted employment policies 
by means of wage subsidies or public employment schemes, improved 
education and training, and to remedy unacceptable income inequalities which 
cannot be eliminated by such policies; (b) upon willingness to accept some 
discipline with regard to the average wage level in both slack and tight labour 
markets ... Principles of reciprocity and efficiency in the implementation of 
employment programmes and social policies have to underpin the willingness 
to redistribute. There are no convincing arguments that ‘globalization’ has made 
it impossible to overcome these constraints. 
 
Others (Pierson 1998) have ‘cautioned against the acceptance of a grossly oversimplified 
vision of national welfare states under siege from the forces of footloose global capital” 
pointing out that while there is some truth to the account other overlapping social 
transformations such as the changing nature of technology and the ageing population 
generating their own challenges to welfare states.  
Between these two extremes lies a measure of consensus about what the 
current liberalising mode of globalization has done both to the labour and social 
problems that governments confront and to the capacity of governments to make social 
policy. One issue over which there is some agreement is that there is a logic in the 
context of globalization in shifting from pay-roll taxes and work based insurance 
arrangements to taxes on and benefits for citizens and residents. Ganghof and Genschel 
(1999) have shown how ‘tax competition ... has constrained policy responses by making 
some forms of revenue raising more costly’. Scharpf  (1998, 173) has reminded us that, 
 
the symbiosis of capitalism and democracy was only successful because the 
costs of the welfare state were borne by workers and consumers, rather than by 
capitalists. If this ‘impossibility theorem of redistribution’ is accepted, the loss of 
national regulatory capacity reduces itself to the relatively technical question of 
where the cost of (new) regulation should be placed. If they are placed on firms 
that are exposed to international competition, and if all other conditions remain 
the same, there will be a loss of international competitiveness ... if new social 
regulations, such as the German disability-care insurance, were financed 
through taxes on incomes and consumption, rather than through pay-roll taxes, 
enterprises would stay competitive. 
 
A second issue over which there is a measure of agreement is that the 
internationalisation of the economy has had an impact upon the labour market North 
and South. In particular it seems indisputable that international trade and technological 
changes have contributed to a lowering of the cost of unskilled low wage labour, 
particularly in those sectors exposed to international competition and increased as a 
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consequence the gap between the better paid and the worst (Wood 1994). Pressures for 
more flexibility in even skilled labour markets continue (Rhodes 1998). However as 
Vandenbroucke argues this only increases the moral case for more and not less 
redistribution to finance subsidy payments to low wages (Vandenbroucke 1998). 
Following on from a meeting of OECD Ministers of Labour and Social Affairs in June 
1998 the OECD (1999) are now also asserting that globalization may generate the 
pressure for more, not less social expenditure. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In terms of the impact of global liberalisation upon not only developed welfare states but 
other economies elsewhere in the world we can say that: 
 
 The North has been tempted to turn welfare states into competition states at the cost 
of social cohesion but some have maintained a universalistic commitment to social 
protection in the face of these pressures. Others have tried to combine flexibility with 
social consensus. New initiatives supported by governments to regulate TNCs with 
codes of conduct have arisen.  
 
 The post-communist East has been subject to enormous pressure from global 
financial institutions to replace its system of social guarantees with a residualized 
and privatized liberal social policy. When this pressure takes the forms of loans to 
rebuild social protection systems on conditions it is proved hard to resist.  
 
 South East Asia has borne the brunt of the irresponsible herd instincts of short term 
financial speculators. Malaysia is the first to re-establish controls over capital flows. 
Such a response to the negative social consequences of a liberalized globalization will 
multiply unless there is a greater recognition of the need for global financial 
regulation and a socially responsible globalization. 
 
 Latin America has been in the forefront of the wish of the global insurance and 
pension providers to extend their market share in countries with previous PAYG tax 
based government social security schemes.  
 
 Many developing countries have seen opportunities presented by globalization to 
profit from existing low social and labor standards and to attract investment that 
otherwise would have gone to the North. Some countries are also selling natural 
assets on the global market with little thought to sustainability of natural resources. 
The temptation to short-termism will continue unless global agreements can be 
reached which reconcile the conflicts of interest between the North and the South in 
these matters. 
 
 Large parts of Africa have been the absolute losers to date in the new global scenario. 
The amount of foreign direct investment has been minimal while at the same time 
 - 11 - 
 
many countries are suffering from the AIDS pandemic and from continued instability 
traceable back to the shortcomings of the colonial era.  
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CHAPTER TWO: THE NEED FOR A SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE  
GLOBALIZATION 
 
Diverse political responses to globalization 
 
The extent of the impact of the current phase of globalization upon the capacity of 
welfare states to continue to provide the same level of social protection is disputed but 
can not be ignored. Equally it is clear that if the liberalising phase continues into global 
agreements about multilateral investment in health and other services and insurance 
then the impact will grow. It is also evident that many social policy changes are being 
undertaken in the name of globalization to mask ideological preferences for deregulation 
and residualisation. Equally it is clear that there has been a negative impact upon the 
capacity of some developing countries to sustain or improve on their social programmes 
as a result of economic globalization. 
In the face of this a number of responses to globalization can be discerned all of 
which have implications directly or indirectly for social policy and provision. The most 
important may be listed as: 
 
 1)  Individualisation of risk responsibility (Holzmann and Jorgensen 1999) 
 2) Anti globalist protectionism (Laing and Hines 1995) 
 3) Post-modern celebration of diversity (Cox 1997) 
 4) Hope in the marginalised (Hoogvelt 1997) 
 5) Global social reformism (Deacon 1997) 
 
The first is the view which seems to shape the intellectual underpinnings of the World 
Bank’s emerging strategy for social protection policy. It concedes that globalization and 
associated changes in work and in the weakened capacity of states to continue to provide 
for their citizens as before generates a risky world. A key element of a global social 
policy response should be to encourage a greater reliance on personal risk insurance 
strategies. Ideally above a minimum level of social protection to be guaranteed by 
government all should be privately insured for the whole range of life eventualities such 
as old age, ill health, care when elderly etc. It concedes too much to liberalising 
globalization and rewards the private players such as insurance companies waiting to 
profit from the erosion of state social responsibility. 
The second would roll back the story of globalization and argue for a greater 
degree of self reliance of states and regions on their own resources. It would re-impose 
trade barriers, limit foreign direct investment and control capital flows. It would 
husband local sustainable resources for production. This is an understandable reaction 
both north and south to the worst aspects of globalization. It points to the need to 
manage the process and speed with which economies open themselves to the global 
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market. It risks, however, throwing out the baby with the bathwater. The benefits of a 
regulated globalization would be lost and it may condemn some countries to a stage of 
development which all would not be happy with. 
The third puts the case that concern to globalise human and social rights and to 
wish upon less developed countries some of the features of the more developed is to ride 
rough shod over cultural diversity. The west is seen here as imposing a set of social 
values upon an unwilling world in a modern day version of imperialism with a new 
moral garb. Diversity in culture and social policy and what constitues the good society 
should prevail over UN standards. This view while appropriately recognising that social 
rights need to be met and associated services delivered in culturally sensitive ways can 
come close to abandoning the struggle for a decent life for all as measured by a globally 
agreed set of human rights and entitlements. 
The fourth position is held by those who see a hope in the margins of the world 
and the margins of the formal economy. Those who are already excluded from global 
economic interconnectedness whether they be the unemployed on council estates in 
Britain surviving on non monetary units of exchange and skill trading or those who 
depend on the real economy of informal transactions in war torn states are the 
harbingers of a future which breaks from the unsustainable formal global economy. This 
view gives recognition to the ways in which formal economic growth can measure things 
which have nothing to do with meeting real needs. It also acknowledges the point that, 
by contrast, human needs can be effectively met in the context of non monetary 
exchanges. Taken to extreme, however, it can seem romantic in the face of the 
importance of the impact of the formal global economy.  
 
Global social reformism 
 
While acknowledging the value of some of the insights of the second, third and fourth 
positions we argue in this report for a fifth response to a liberalising globalization which 
we call global social reformism. It is a position which is opposed to the first strategy 
which would allow global social policy to follow the drift of global neo-liberalism. A 
social policy concerned with justice within and between countries begins from the 
necessity of intervening in the market in order to correct its inequity generating 
dynamic. Just as unfettered capitalism within single countries in the 19th century led 
through class struggle, fear of the underclass, and through the persuasion of reformists 
to cross-class compacts providing varying degrees of social security so now at the close 
of the 20th century we are witnessing the same calls for the reform of global capitalism 
for fear of the consequences. The fears oscillate between the spectre of social 
disintegration, crime and social unrest which would follow if the current phase of 
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liberalising globalism were to go unchecked and the warnings of a new national and 
regional protectionism with the subsequent danger of international conflict that this 
would presage. 
Paul Hirst who has been associated with the view that the extent and impact of 
globalization is often overstated warns (Hirst 1997, 425): 
 
under the rhetoric of responding to international competitive pressures many 
countries are cutting welfare, attempting to reduce wages, and rendering labour 
markets more competitive. They are in danger of damaging prosperity by 
undermining its social foundations ... The danger of recklessly pursued 
internationalisation without sufficient regard to its social effects is that there will 
be revolts against an open international economy in both the advanced and the 
developing world. In the developing world new protectionism arguments are 
gaining momentum and span a broad political spectrum. Thus we see 
environmentalists rejecting long-distance trade between advanced countries as 
wasteful, trade unions opposing the threat of accelerated job losses to low wage 
countries, and populist business figures turned politicians like Ross Perot and 
Sir James Goldsmith, arguing for protection. 
 
These fears are echoed by Rhodes after reviewing the impact of globalization upon 
European welfare states (Rhodes 1996, 327): 
 
Deferring the answer (to the problems posed by globalization) will not solve the 
problem. Rather it will lead to one of two negative outcomes: the erosion of 
civilised societies or the limitations of international capital mobility. 
 
Historical research (Rieger and Liebfried 1998) on the relationship between periods of 
open globalization and welfare spending within the USA supports the case that periods 
of open free trade have been associated with more rather than less social spending. 
Rieger concludes that ‘disregard of the social implications of free trade and increased 
import competition will result in less, and not more integrated economies’ (Rieger and 
Liebfried 1995). The dominant influence of fundamentalist liberal economic thinking in 
the 70’ and 80’ has obscured this historical truth. Recent comparative research also points 
to the conclusion that ‘openness and internationalisation of small countries has rather 
been associated with increasing than with decreasing welfare spending’ (Kosonen 1998). 
Fortunately there is evidence of an understanding of these historic and comparative 
truths in supranational circles. The OECD’s recent analysis entitled The Caring World 
(OECD 1999) produced following the Ministerial Level conference on Social Policy in 
June 23-24th 1998 asserts in the context of a review of the impact of globalization that 
because of the dislocation of production associated with it ‘one of the effects of 
globalization could be to increase the demand for social protection ... a more useful blue 
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print for reform would be to recognise that globalization reinforces the need for some 
social protection’(OECD 1999). 
  I have argued elsewhere (Deacon 1997; 1999) for a socially responsible 
globalization and suggested some of the steps that would be entailed. To recapitulate 
what appears to be needed is to envisage at the global level mechanisms of 
governance in the social sphere that exist at the national and regional level. 
Governments manage their economies so as to reduce the risk of crisis, they ensure the 
existence of public goods that markets do not automatically provide and they raise 
revenue in order to, among other things, achieve a reasonable degree of equity and social 
justice. A schematic way of imagining the reforms needed for a socially responsible 
globalization is therefore to project onto the global level the policies of social 
redistribution, social regulation and social empowerment that governments do when 
engaging in social policy nationally.  
Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc Stern (1999) addressing a wider set of 
concerns than social policy has argued similarly that the world has not yet found a way 
of ensuring the provision of global public goods because public policy making has not 
yet adjusted to three gaps which exist between present practice and present realities. 
These gaps are identified as jurisdictional (the gap between the global boundaries of 
today’s major problems and the national boundaries of policy-making), participation 
(which results from the fact that global issues are influenced by a variety of global actors 
but policy making is still intergovernmental) and an incentive gap (which results from 
the fact that moral persuasion is not enough to ensure countries co-operate for the 
common good). Others (Kapstein 1998; 1999; Ghai 1999) have recently begun to think 
through what their previous criticisms of neo-liberal globalization might mean for global 
refomist politics. Kapstein (1998) has argued ‘if public officials ... wish to pursue deeper 
integration (of the global economy) they will need to do more than focus on efficiency 
gains, they must strive for justice as well’. In the context of these ways of thinking a set 
of global policy measures dealing with redistribution, regulation and empowerment are 
emerging. They include;   
 
 Social Redistribution: 
i)   Independent sources of taxation for the UN such as the TOBIN tax on currency 
exchange,  
  ii) Granting of Debt Relief with resulting funds used for social expenditure.  
 iii)  NAFTA, ASEAN, MERCUSOR, to emulate EU internal redistribution and 
regional development policies. 
 
 Social Regulation:  
i)   Social considerations to be included in the next round of World Trade 
Organisation negotiations,  
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  ii) Bank and IMF to collaborate with and defer to UN social agencies when 
proposing economic and social reforms, 
 iii)  UN Economic and Social Secretariat and UN social agencies to collaborate for 
strength and effectiveness. 
                       
 Social Empowerment 
 i)  Generalise the Council of Europe’s Court of human rights and extend to include 
social rights. 
ii) Strengthen the voice of civil society at UN and Bretton Woods. 
 
The triangulation of Redistribution, Regulation and Empowerment holds the key to 
global social progress. Global citizens would be enabled to make their claims for social 
rights as set out by agreed rules because resource redistribution would have made it 
possible for these rights to be realised in practice. Put differently the interconnectedness 
of Trade, Aid and Standards is the key to global social responsibility. Common global 
social, health and labour rights (the elements of an emerging global social citizenship) 
can not be achieved without a policy of intra regional and inter regional social 
redistribution which, in addition to local economic development, is necessary to resource 
the realisation in practice of these rights. Free trade alone without these two other 
components will only generate more global inequity and perpetuate the challenge to 
standards where they already exist. 
 
Steps towards a socially responsible globalization 
 
It is now possible not only to note a set of worthy reform proposal such as those listed 
above a few of which might become realistic politics in the new Millennium, but also to 
discern concrete steps that are already being taken to usher in a more socially 
responsible globalization. Among these steps might be noted: 
 
 the move from human rights to social rights and from declaration to implementation;  
 the trend in International Development Co-operation towards setting goals and 
monitoring progress; 
 the move to secure global minimum labour, social and health standards; 
 the move to establish codes of practice for socially responsible investment and 
business; 
 the calls for global economic regulation and taxation; 
 the moves to extend constructive regionalism with a social dimension. 
 
Each of these steps are problematic in some ways but taken together do suggest a shift 
away from a global politics of liberalism to a global politics of social concern. Each of 
these is reviewed briefly in turn before we examine in later chapters the specific success 
or failure of the EU’s contribution to this process. 
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In terms of human rights the end of the cold war broke a log jam in the conflict 
between the west and the east as to which rights were regarded as more essential. The 
west accused the east of not respecting political and civil rights by preventing free 
elections and not treating all equally before the law. The east retorted that much of the 
west did not secure the social rights of all of its citizens. Now it has proved far harder for 
the west to make this split between types of rights. Conferences such as the Vienna 
Conference on Human Rights assert the indivisibility of all human rights not 
withstanding the resource and distribution implications of including social rights in 
those to be supported. The most significant step in thinking through the global social 
policy implications of the UN’s Convention on Social Cultural and Economic Rights has 
been take recently within the context of the UK government’s initiative on a global code 
of best practice in social policy. (Ferguson 1999.) At the same time the United Nations 
development group of agencies has embarked on a programme of making common 
country assessments using the UN and related conventions as bench marks for assessing 
policy (UN Development Group 1999). These steps and their associated pros and cons 
and the role of the EU in this movement for global social rights will be discussed in 
chapter four. 
While overseas aid budgets have in general been falling in the past decade, a 
trend which clearly needs to be reversed, there has been an increasing attempt to co-
ordinate and make more effective the limited aid available. One element of this has been 
the moves towards sector wide approaches (e.g. health and education sectors) where all 
bilateral interventions within one country are geared to achieving an agreed sectoral 
strategy in partnership with recipient governments. Within this context the Development 
Assistance Committee of the OECD has agreed a set of specific targets to be met by 2015 
including the reduction of absolute poverty, the introduction of primary education for all 
and the global meeting of basic reproductive health rights. Debt relief may help finance 
these steps. The question as to how this understandable focus on targeting only the poor 
and the meeting of only basic education and health needs impacts on the possible 
privatisation of higher levels of care will be discussed in chapter five. Here too we will 
review both the role that the EU has played in these moves and the implications of these 
steps for the possible concerns of some European countries to establish a more 
universalistic approach to social policy and social development. 
  In terms of securing minimum labour, and social standards perhaps the most 
significant step has been the resolution on core labour standards by the ILO (1997) in the 
wake of the failure of the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Singapore 1996 to agree to include 
the use of a social clause as a legitimate sanction in international trade. This specification 
which the ILO and other bodies are hoping will become a de facto global agreement 
provides among others for the right to organise, the right to equal treatment and for the 
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outlawing of harmful child labour. The question as to whether this attempt at reaching a 
global agreement on minimum labour standards is sufficient to protect the higher social 
security related standards common in the developed world and the associated issue of 
the role of the EU in these debates will be examined in chapter six. 
Associated with these debates on core labour standards has been moves to 
encourage the multinational TNCs to voluntarily adopt codes of practice which guide 
their employment practices globally. A pincer movement of international trade unionism 
on the one hand and a growing social concern among consumers in the north has 
conspired to bring this self regulation onto the agenda. Within the ILO too there are 
controversial discussions concerning the labelling of products which would approve 
them in terms of the conditions under which they are produced. Some of the problems 
associated with these moves and the role of the EU in this debate will also be reviewed in 
chapter six.  
Recent months have seen a veritable clamour of competing ideas as to whether 
to and how to bring under some kind of regulation the uncontrolled short term 
movements of finance capital which have had negative social consequences for several 
parts of the world. The focus has been on establishing through the Bank of International 
Settlements in Basle or by other means supervised by the IMF a code of practice for the 
Banking sectors in countries in receipt of short term speculative flows. The idea would 
be to discourage such flows by making more transparent the financial and economic 
situation of countries uncertainty about which feeds speculation and herd instincts. At 
the same time there have been calls to reintroduce controls on capital flows to ensure 
lasting real investment. Within this context it has been suggested that when lending to 
countries the IMF needs to police a set of common standards for all countries. These 
include not only standards for the financial sector but also standards of good governance 
and social policy standards to enable the effective handling of the social consequences of 
remaining economic problems. Also the head of the fiscal affairs department of the IMF 
has articulated the case for a global tax authority to begin to outlaw tax havens and to 
regulate tax regimes. The role of the EU in all of this will also be reviewed in chapter six. 
Finally in this list of the steps being taken in practice towards a socially 
responsible globalization are the moves to a constructive regionalism with a social 
dimension. There is a debate as to whether regional trading blocks are stepping stones or 
obstacles to more effective global governance. A question is whether the emerging 
regional groupings can be better linked in some way to a UN regional approach. In this 
context the EU can be perceived as a self interested protectionist trading block which 
excludes from access to its markets some goods that challenge its interests and is 
concerned only to defend its social standards won on the backs of imperialism in the past 
or guest worker relationships of the present. On the other hand the EU can be said to be 
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a model of emerging regional and global governance embodying social redistribution 
between richer and poorer regions, social regulation of capital across borders and the 
social empowerment of EU citizens who can challenge their governments in court when 
they perceive their social rights to be ignored. Whether the EU sees itself in this light and 
how it might make a contribution to such regionalism elsewhere and whether the EU 
processes of supranational governance can be regarded in some ways as providing a 
model for global governance reform will form part of the final assessment in chapter 
seven of the EU’s contribution to a socially responsible globalization.   
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CHAPTER THREE: EUROPE CHALLENGED BY GLOBALIZATION 
 
The question therefore arises as to how has the EU and its member states responded to 
globalization. In particular how has this influenced its thinking not only about its own 
concern to retain a social dimension to its economic zone but also to contribute to a social 
dimension to globalization. In this chapter we will firstly note that the challenge 
globalization poses to social policy in Europe affects different countries differently and 
therefore has induced a varied response by different countries to the challenge. Secondly 
we will attempt to capture how the EU has a whole has responded to globalization and 
in particular how far that part of the European Commission most concerned with the 
social dimension has responded. Thirdly we will approach the issue as to how far it 
might be possible to speak of a more concerted effort emerging by the EU as a whole to 
contribute more effectively to a socially responsible globalization. Here we will be 
dealing with the issue of the constitution of the EU and its Commission in international 
fora. We will be asking to what extent the external dimension of the EU’s social policy is 
shaped by the common foreign and security policy or by the internal social policy of the 
EU? We will examine how the policies of other parts of the Commission such as those 
concerned with trade and external relations, of the European Parliament, of the 
Economic and Social Committee, or indeed of the intergovernmental process within 
Europe and in relation to other fora impact on social policy both internally and on its 
external form. This will lead into the remaining chapters where the contribution of the 
EU to several of the strategies being taken to make the world a more socially just place 
are reviewed in more detail. 
 
European countries react differently to globalization 
 
In terms of diverse country responses within Europe it can be said that there are 
examples of the three types of responses to globalization that Esping-Anderson reported 
in his review of social welfare in a global context (Esping-Andersen 1996). This confirms 
the findings of Kosonen (1998) that ‘there is no direct causal link between globalization 
and welfare policies ... the ... relation is mediated by choices made in national economic 
policy making’. These three European responses can be described as:  
 
 Liberalization and residualisation exacerbating inequality; 
 Preserving workplace based social security arrangements which can create the 
insider-outsider problem; 
 Continuing to give priority to social democratic universalism of citizenship rights 
which can confront globalization with equity. 
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Britain falls into the category of countries who have adopted liberalizing and market 
driven responses to the pressures of globalization on their social policies. Reducing the 
social wage has been undertaken through greater selectivity, ‘workfare’ and the gradual 
erosion of benefits and/or coverage. The capacity of neo-liberal welfare states to combat 
poverty is weakened. For example, the post-transfer poverty rate among young 
households (20-29) rose to 53 percent in the UK in the 1980s. Child poverty remains very 
high in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Since the election of the current Labour government 
much has been made of the third way idea (Giddens 1998) which claims to be able to 
steer a course between accommodation to liberal globalization with its associated 
poverty wages and resisting it completely which courts the danger of job 
unemployment.  
The assessment of this strategy by European partners is important and much 
will depend on whether the third way is, as Giddens insists a modernization of social 
democracy within a global context or a refutation of it. Current British social policy 
seems to be straddling between a social democratic impulse when it comes to universal 
health and education spending and neo-liberalism when it comes to reducing state 
pension provision and to a residualisation of some social benefits. What British social 
policy amounts to and whether it is an accommodation with American liberalism or 
something much more in keeping with the policies of the continent of Europe is 
important. It matters not only for British citizens but also, because of the UK’s significant 
role internationally in shaping the content of the emerging global social policy code.  
Much of continental European initially chose another approach to the 
problems created by globalization, the labor reduction approach: subsidizing workers’ 
exit from the labor market mainly through early retirement. This according to Esping-
Andersen created an ‘insider-outsider’ scenario ‘with a small, predominantly male, 
‘insider’ workforce enjoying high wages, expensive social rights, and strong job security, 
combined with a swelling population of ‘outsiders’ depending either on the male 
breadwinner’s pay or on welfare state transfers’ (1996, 28). The roots of this system can 
be traced to the continental European welfare state combination of highly developed 
social insurance (especially pensions) and underdeveloped social services (such as public 
child care). 
This familialistic transfer state rewards full-time male employment since 
entitlements are related to one’s employment records and punishes working wives, as 
social services to families are highly underdeveloped. For instance, public child care 
coverage in Germany, the Netherlands and Italy is low. The dual problems of mass 
retirement and mass unemployment have created rising financial requirements, growing 
social contributions and therefore fixed labour costs. In Germany for example, although 
the standard legal retirement age is 65, about half of the population retires earlier placing 
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a severe burden on the system. Early retirement due to unemployment rose more than 
130 percent between 1992 and 1995 in western Germany and by some 600 percent in 
eastern Germany. 
The indirect effect of these pressures is that employers have regulated their 
labour needs through an adjustment of hours rather than taking on extra workers. Also, 
the marginal costs of part-time employment tend to be high which works against female 
employment. Strong incentives to participate in the informal sector or to pursue self-
employment further undermines the welfare state’s tax base. Hence, the labour market 
rigidities built into this system stem from most families’ dependence on the male 
earner’s pay and social rights – leading to a situation where ‘insiders’ strongly defend 
their existing position through trade unions. To reduce rigidities in this welfare state 
would mean diminishing dependency on the male single wage earner and fostering 
women’s labour force participation. The experiments within the Netherlands to reform 
its system so that it more successfully provide for decent flexible employment is an 
interesting development. The current governments of France and Germany are exercised 
by these perceived rigidities in the inherited workplace based social security system and 
are struggling to find other means of financing social expenditures while at the same 
time raising the pensionable age. 
Sweden, as an example of the social democratic model, with its declining fiscal 
capacity combined with rising pressures on public job creation and/or income 
maintenance has been marginally adjusting its system toward an emerging ‘social 
investment’ approach. The Swedish model in the 1970s and 1980s combined equality and 
a productivist social policy that promised full employment and an equal status for 
women. Given the steady decline in manufacturing employment and wage solidarity, 
employment was sustained through the public sector. Until the mid-1980s this sector 
accounted for 80 percent of total net job growth and currently represents about 30 
percent of total employment. From a welfare point of view, the Scandinavian system of 
public employment offers not only job pay and security but also a large number of 
quality jobs to women which allow them to harmonize careers and childbearing. 
However, the system rests on a large tax burden which is only sustainable if high rates of 
productivity growth are maintained. Declining fiscal capacity has undermined the 
Swedish system in recent years leading to growing wage differences, adjustments of the 
marginal tax rate and social entitlements meant to reduce negative work incentives and 
high absenteeism. There is now also more emphasis on ‘workfare’ and benefits are more 
closely related to contributions. These reforms indicate a process of marginal adjustment 
rather than a paradigmatic shift away from the basic principles of the universal welfare 
state. The experience of Finland tunneling through the worst recession in OECD 
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countries in post war times with its egalitarianism intact is instructive. (Heikkilä and 
Uusitalo 1997.) 
While it is possible to detect the differences between countries in their 
responses to globalization others have argued that irrespective of political ideology there 
are some common trends across the whole of Europe in terms of social policy changes. 
Vic George (1998) notes that there have been eight types of reform brought into play 
across Europe which have contractionist aims as far as social welfare is concerned. Tax 
incentives are encouraging more people to rely on private provision. Some 
responsibilities for benefits such as sick pay have been shifted to employers. Restricted 
entitlements to unemployment benefits are taking place. Benefit levels are being 
reduced. User charges for health care are on the increase. Salary levels of state employees 
lags behind the private sector. Public utilities are being privatised. Quasi markets are 
being introduced within the operation of public services.   
It has also been argued that different finds of Welfare States represented in 
Europe are differentially vulnerable to globalization and this explains what diverse 
responses there have been. (Palier, Prior and Sykes forthcoming to 2000). A summary of 
some of the considerations is set out below. Here globalization is unpacked into 
component elements. Capital flows and associated currency speculation is one element 
which has impacted on transition countries. Increased free trade is another which 
differentially effects countries. Embeddedness in the international production system is a 
third and here there are country differences. Finally an element of globalization which is 
of particular relevance to the post communist developed countries is the role of the 
global financial institutions in shaping through loan conditionality a particular model of 
social protection. 
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Figure 3.1.  The complex impact of aspects of globalization upon european welfare 
states 
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The outcome of this review and analysis suggests that: 
 
1. Liberal social policy involving residualisation, individualisation and 
privatisation chimes with the present phase of liberalising globalization but at 
the cost of inequity. 
2. Workplace based welfare systems of the former state socialist countries and the 
high payroll tax based Bismarckian insurance systems are vulnerable to global 
competitive pressures. 
3. Social democratic citizenship based welfare systems funded out of consumption 
taxes are, given the political will, surprisingly sustainable in the face of global 
pressures.  
 
Whether the EU as a whole accepts this analysis and has guided its internal and external 
social policy in the light of it we will turn to shortly. 
 
One of the consequences of globalization in Europe could be said to be the adoption of 
the European Monetary Union or EMU. The point is to strengthen currencies against 
global competition. The impact of the EMU on the social polices of those countries who 
have joined it have themselves been variable even though of course the convergence 
requirement itself dictates a common approach to avoiding deficit spending and hence it 
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has been argued makes a radical Keynesian strategy of spending ones way out of 
recession difficult. Pakaslahti (1998) has noted the existence of four groupings of 
countries in terms of their social policy responses to the EMU. He argues that in the run 
up to the EMU Germany, France and Belgium used the convergence criteria to reduce 
social expenditure. Portugal, Spain and Italy were attempting to avoid cuts in social 
expenditure. In the case of the Nordic states which are differently placed in terms of their 
membership of EMU (some in some not) any changes in social protection was not linked 
to EMU and there remains a strong will to retain the social democratic approach to social 
welfare. Finally Luxembourg and Ireland had already met the criteria without any need 
for social policy changes. (Britain outside the EMU for now had, as we have noted above 
introduced some of the more radical social policy changes unconnected to this process).  
 
The EU vacillates in response to the challenges of globalization 
 
Is it possible to characterise the response of the EU as a whole to the pressures of a 
liberalising globalization? In sum it can be asserted that the response in terms of both its 
internal and external social dimension has been variable over time and between 
component parts of the EU system. This variability will be reviewed in general terms 
here but given more substance in the subsequent chapters which take different aspects of 
policy in turn. Included within this range of responses are: 
 
 accommodation to the liberalising global agenda in labour markets and associated 
social policy; 
 social protectionist inclinations in some of its trade dealings  
 expressions of global social concern for human rights in its common foreign and 
security policy; 
 assertiveness at the level of discourse if not in terms of deeds regarding the need for a 
social dimension to enlargement; 
 attempts to link trade aid and standards within some of its development policy; 
 recently a new assertiveness about the social dimension within the global discourse 
on social policy. 
 
Accommodation to the requirements of a liberalising globalization certainly 
characterised much of the discussion about labour markets and social policy during the 
mid 1990s when the series of green and white papers on social policy emanating from 
the Commission (1993; 1994) addressed the need for more flexible working practices, the 
introduction of new kinds of contract, the reduction of the indirect costs of labour, the 
shift from passive unemployment benefits to an active labour market policy, increased 
retraining and educational opportunities. Here a juggling act was going on with the 
Commission wishing to support social protection policies but only in so far as they 
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adapted to some perceived requirements of increased global economic competition. 
Adaptation to the realities of liberal globalization was the priority at that point in time.   
At much the same time however in the context of the run up to the 
establishment of the WTO and then in relation to the WTO Ministerial meeting in 
Singapore in 1996 the EU could be said to have been influenced by protectionist 
concerns. Clearly the need to protect the Common Agricultural Policy which is a kind of 
minimum income entitlement for a section of the EU population motivated the 
restrictions on trade in this sector. At the Singapore meeting the case was put for linking 
trade to a social clause with a view to both protecting the social standards of Europe but 
also to try to generalise these elsewhere. From the point of view of many in the 
developing world it was the protectionist sentiments which were perceived as being 
behind the concerns of northern countries. 
Much is made during this period and up to today of the element of the 
common foreign and security policy of the EU which embraces human rights. The EU 
clearly sees itself as a player on the global stage concerned to bring about the realisation 
of human rights internationally. This has found reflection in its trade policy with the 
ACP nations, in its foreign policy in terms even of wars associated with NATO, in terms 
of aspects of its international development policy and as a consideration in its 
humanitarian activities. How far laudable aims in this regard have extended to social as 
distinct from civil and political rights and how far policy has had a positive impact in 
practice we shall consider in the later chapters. 
In relation to the impending enlargement of the European Union the 
requirements of membership extend to a limited number of legal requirements in the 
social sphere. These include the equal treatment of men and women, and the adoption of 
certain health and safety standards. These legal requirements of membership have 
however been increasingly talked up by Commission officials as they engage in 
screenings of the applicant countries. It is being argued that applicant countries are 
joining a common social space which has high expectations regarding consensus forms 
of policy making and of decent levels of social protection. Paradoxically the 
subcontracting methods used by the EU to influence social provision through technical 
assistance under PHARE and TACIS have lead to the Commission loosing some control 
of the policy content of these projects to a diverse army of private consultants. 
Some aspects of the trade policy of the EU can be said to be motivated by a 
concern to use trade for social beneficial purposes elsewhere in the world. Its system of 
differential tariff preferences which benefit countries meeting some of the ILO’s core 
labour standards or otherwise improving their social polices is geared to linking trade to 
standards but in a way which is not regarded negatively as a sanction but as a positive 
incentive. How far these policies are more than symbolic and how they will be affected 
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by the imminent round of both WTO negotiations and the negotiations to revise the 
LOME agreements between the EU and the ACP countries is something to be reviewed 
in detail in a later chapter. 
The forgoing has characterised EU policy with regard to the task of injecting a 
social dimension into globalization as variable in time and policy area. It has ranged 
through the near capitulation to the global liberal agenda, through expressions of social 
protectionism, and on to attempts at least at the level of words to inject a social 
dimension into globalization. This vacillation is not dissimilar to that found in EU 
environmental policy in the context of globalization. Golub (1998) showed effectively 
how in this field too the EU was juggling with the need to be globally competitive while 
at the same time to protect the environment. When attempting to win global adherence 
to environmental standards it is faced with a setting of second best standards. If 
concerned to improve on these for the EU and take these into account in trade policy it 
falls into the trap of eco-protectionism. 
In terms of social policy there are recent signs that the Commission is 
concerned to inject a more systematic approach and a more assertive approach into what 
it has called the external dimension of European Social Policy. In the context of the 
Austrian Presidency of the Union in late 1998 the head of DG 5, Allan Larsson in a 
speech at a conference on the new challenges of globalization (9-10 November 1998) 
argued that ‘We have created the best social safety nets in the world ... social policy is a 
productive factor in economic performance ... (this) is now emerging as the basis of the 
new G8 social policy discussions and is becoming very important in delivering the 
substance of the transatlantic dialogue too”. His choice of the term safety net has been 
explained as a strategy for EU to own this term and convert its meaning into a more 
universalistic approach to social policy. It seems to have acknowledged the point of 
Navarro (1998) and others that it is the politics of globalization which matters most and 
not an economic determinism mistakenly associated with it. This more assertive 
approach was also foreshadowed in the 1998-2000 Social Action Programme of the 
Commission (COM (1998) 259). This asserted that  
‘the European social model is very appealing to countries outside the  
  Union both in central and eastern Europe and in a world-wide context. 
  ..............since the European Union is the single largest trading bloc  
  in the world......it has an important role to play in promoting social pro 
  -gress on the world stage.’ 
 
The communication went on to promise a Communication on the development of the 
external dimension of European Social Policy. This communication which would have 
dealt with the social aspects of enlargement, with a codification of the role of the EU vis a 
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vis the UN etc, and with certain trade issues has been delayed because of the 
Commission’s resignation.  
 
Who shapes and speaks for the external dimension of EU social policy? 
 
Before we go any further and examine in more detail the EU track record on contributing 
to a global debate about social policy we need to address certain constitutional questions 
and issues to do with political processes within Europe. Who speaks for the EU on the 
global stage? Who has the power to make external policy? What is the relationship 
between the Commission and Parliament and the Council of Ministers? How important 
is the EU Presidency in all of this? Do certain European positions get adopted in global 
fora without reference to ‘official’ EU policy? Clarification of these issues and roles is 
important also if we are to suggest by what means the EU might become a more effective 
voice and actor for a socially responsible globalization.      
To ask these questions is of course to enter the terrain of disputes between 
political scientists and observers of EU affairs some of whom emphasise the traditional 
intergovernmentalist approach to EU politics and others of whom emphasise the relative 
autonomy that the EU through the Commission has won for itself in the making of 
community policy. Sandholtz and Stone-Sweet (1998) suggest that at any one time a snap 
shot of EU politics might emphasise the intergovernmental bargaining while a longer 
time frame of analysis lends support to the relative power of the supranational 
institutions of Europe. Their view is that of a modified neo-functionalism or historic-
institutional analysis whereby transnational actors within the EU, the Commission and 
others who engage transnationally, create space for their autonomy which sets up 
institutions which limit intergovernmentalism. Even in the case of internal social policy 
for example, an area where governments are keen to guard their autonomy under the 
rubric of subsidiarity, they conclude (Sandholtz and Stone-Sweet 1888, 56), that ‘a 
historical-institutional perspective highlights the growing significance of European 
policy, the influence of actors other than member-state governments, and the mounting 
constraints on the possibilities for initiatives by those governments’. This echoes the 
view of Wendon (1998) that the Commission does have capacity to advance social policy 
within the EU. As we shall see in a moment the defence of this view of a supranational 
Europe is hardest to defend in the area of foreign policy where national interests are 
jealously guarded. But even here taking the example of environmental policy (Sbragia 
1998) conclude that ‘The European Community has over time developed the 
international standing and the capacity to become an important international actor in the 
area of international environmental relations’. 
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 Foreign policy and the external dimension of EU social policy is most fraught 
with the tension between intergovernmentalism and a supranational view. There is on 
paper (The Treaty of European Union) a common foreign and security policy which, as 
we shall discuss in more detail in the next chapter, asserts that one of its objectives is to 
‘develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms’. However critics insist (Rummel and Wiedmann 1998, 53) 
that the institutional arrangements which put the CFSP in the hands of the Council of 
Foreign Ministers and these deliberations are not institutionally tied in with the 
Commission in the same way as other policy areas means that ‘the EU largely lacks the 
means and capabilities needed to make decisions and implement them’. They argue that 
theoretically the CFSP ‘can draw support from other EU policies (economic external 
relations, development policy, humanitarian policy) ... but that in practice links with 
instruments outside of CFSP is not developed to the degree that it would be available 
whenever needed”. 
Box and Koulaimah-Gabriel (1997) comment on the lack of policy coherence 
between the CFSP and development policy and note the associated fact that the 
European Development Fund too is not part of the EC development budget. Some have 
argued (Crowe 1998) that the new Amsterdam treaty supported supranationalism in the 
CFSP beyond Maastrich by advancing qualified majority voting and by making the 
Secretary General of the Council of Foreign Ministers as High Representative of the 
CFSP able to speak on its behalf. The establishment of a Policy and Planning and Early 
Warning Unit (PPEWU) in the Council’s Secretariat in Brussels is seen as lending 
support to supranationalism. But from the point of view of our interest in the external 
dimension of EU social policy it is important to note the view of Rummel and Wiedman 
that this does nothing to solve a basic problem which is the narrow conception of what 
might constitute a CFSP. ‘The central issue of modernising the content and substance of 
EU foreign policy is not addressed and resolved. Contrary to traditional foreign and 
defence policy, in the future almost all sectors of public life will have external 
implications ... the present compartmentalised structure of the EU’s external relations 
seems to rigidly ignore the realities of today’s international world’ (Rummel and 
Wiedmann 1998, 54).  
This complexity impacts upon the competence of the EU in relations to 
dialogue and agreements with other international actors and other countries. The EU 
does not have a legal status but the Community in terms of the Commission can assume 
legal responsibility with outsiders. So, too, can member states. This leads to a range of 
situations from Community agreements in relations to the WTO, through mixed 
Community and member state agreements in relation to association agreements. There 
are areas where the Maastrich Treaty endorsed the competence of member states to 
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negotiate in international organisations such as the UN. In relation to many of the issues 
that are of concern to us it is the combination of the continuing role of member states and 
the emerging role of the Commission working in parallel that creates complications. This 
will frustrate our search for a consistent and overarching thrust by the EU playing an 
effective role as an actor working for a socially responsible globalization. The working in 
tandem of the Presidency of the EU representing the member states collectively and the 
Commission is a strategy which has emerged to handle these ambiguities. This will be 
discussed in more detail below.  
If we focus on the relationship of the EU to other international organisations 
which are actors shaping the global discourse concerning the future of welfare we can 
understand just how complicated the situation is. If we then add to that a question about 
the specific role or competence of the Commission in relations to these other actors we 
can also get a sense of what might be expected in terms of a consistent impact of the EU’s 
social dimension in these global fora. The table below summarises the situation. 
 
Figure 3.2  The status of the EU in relation to international organisations 
 
INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANISATION 
STATUS OF EU ROLE OF THE COMMISSION. 
WTO EC legal entity. Commission leads 
OECD Participant but can’t 
block country consensus 
Commission participates 
G7/8 President of EU attends Commission wanting involvement 
in finance meetings 
Council of Europe EC Observer 
  
Commission on Social Affairs 
Committees 
ILO EC Observer 
 
Commission plays no role (see text) 
UN EC Observer Presidency leads.with Commission 
offerring guidance. 
World Bank and IMF no formal role Commission some engagement.  
WHO EC Observer Commission observer. 
 
It is only in the case of the OECD’s Economic, Labour, Education and Social Affairs 
Committee that European Social Policy as understood by the Commission is directly 
represented by the EC as a more or less full member of the committee. In the case of the 
Council of Europe, the ILO, the WHO there is the attendance of the Commission but the 
seat at the Council of Europe is often not take up, at the WHO the Commission member 
works in the health outpost in Luxembourg, and in the case of the ILO the European 
Union plays no role at all. The Commission tested at the Luxembourg Court its exclusive 
competence to deal with the ILO on behalf of member states, but the ruling in 1992. 
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which was for a shared competence with countries was perceived by the Commission as 
a defeat so that it has played no real role. At the ILO meetings there is no tradition of EU 
countries lobbying as a group rather they work with other industrial countries as a bloc. 
Set against this at the level of the liaison of secretariats officials in the Commission 
suggest that the appointment of the new heads of the ILO and of the WHO is likely to 
lead to better relations between the secretariats and they may begin to match those of the 
ones between the EU and the OECD.  
The EU has no formal status at the World Bank or at the IMF. The member 
countries are reluctant to co-ordinate their positions. Together the 15 EU countries have 
more voting power than the US which currently dominates. It has been argued (WIDE 
1997) ‘if member states were willing to work together they could have a significant 
impact’. There is also still something of a stand off between Commission and the Bank at 
the secretariat level as far as social policy is concerned although the Commission 
collaborates more closely on development matters. There is a memorandum of 
understanding between the Bank and the EU but it does not appear to touch closely on 
social policy.  
In the forum of the Commission on Social Development of the UN and the 
associated PrepCom which has responsibility for leading the preparation for the 
Copenhagen plus 5 special session (to review the world’s progress in implementing the 
pledges of the Social Summit) the practice has emerged that the EU Presidency country 
takes the lead in marshalling an EU position which may or may not rely on commission 
input. In that respect there is no institutional memory and therefore not necessarily any 
consistency in policy adopted. Some attempt is being made from the Council of Europe’s 
new Social Exclusion Committee to co-ordinate the role of the EU and other European 
actors in the run up to the Copenhagen plus 5. It remains to be seen at the time of writing 
how this will evolve. 
This appears to leaves the Commisssion and in particular those within it who 
have the responsibility for shaping social policy far removed from direct influence when 
it comes to the World Bank, the WTO and to some extent the G7/8. Given that global 
social policy is increasingly being made either by default or explicitly in these fora it 
suggests that the Commission has a lot of lobbying to do to get its voice heard in the 
places that matter.  
Given the above it is suprising to find the commonly expressed sentiment that 
the EU is and should be a force in the world for social progress. Rosencrance (1997) 
reviewing the international role of the EU has said that ‘the continent that once ruled the 
world through the physical imposition of imperialism is now coming to set world 
standards in normative terms’. As we have already note in the field of global 
environmental policy some success of the EU has been noted. This success is attributed 
by Sbragia (1998) to the working together of the intergovernmental aspects of the Union 
through the Presidency and the federal aspects of the Union through the Commission. So 
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despite all the disjunctures between the CFSP and the Commission and the problems 
with the legal status of the EU in international relations there is a hope for an effective 
external dimension of the EU’s social policy. The next chapters examine these prospects 
in more detail. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: GLOBALISING SOCIAL RIGHTS 
 
In this chapter we examine one of the steps towards a socially responsible globalization 
that appears now to be afforded priority attention within the international dialogue. First 
some of the controversy surrounding the West’s concern with human rights is reviewed. 
Then the most recent contribution to this debate which focuses on social rights is 
summarised. The EU’s contribution to this movement towards globalising social rights is 
then assessed. 
 
International human and social rights: ‘moralising without resources’ or ‘real global 
progress’?  
 
The opposition of some southern governments to the call to uphold global labour 
standards in the context of free trade is reflected also in an increasingly articulate 
opposition to the claims by the west made in the name of the world community that they 
are upholding universal human rights. International human rights activists who are 
seeking to implement the universal declaration of human rights become seen not as 
‘guardian angels’ (Wheeler 1996) but as supporters of ‘global (imperialist) gangsters’ 
who are using the ethical claims of international society to assert a new global 
hegemony. In the context of the collapse of the cold war Chandler (1996) has argued the 
thesis that the focus on the protection of minority rights by the West through agencies 
such as the OSCE is recreating the East-West divide by asserting the moral superiority of 
the West and demonising the East.  
The view that the West is often hypocritical on these questions and does not 
address human rights abuse in its own backyard has been given prominence recently by 
Amnesty International. The Prime Minister of Malaysia’s much reported comment that 
the West does not have a monopoly on human rights is one of the most visible aspect of 
this controversy. Cultural diversity has been used to justify a different moral and social 
policy agenda in Islamic societies (Dean and Khan 1997) and has recently been used to 
argue (Wong 1998) that in the context of China the European-like social policy reforms 
being suggested for the social security and social assistance schemes are likely to founder 
on the rock of Confucian indifference to the concept of rights granted by states to its 
citizens (Tao and Driver 1997). 
The most powerful criticism of the human rights stance of western donors has 
been made recently by Katarina Tomasevski. She argues (Tomasevski 1997, 240) that the 
audience for the strand of human rights conditionality in aid policy is primarily 
domestic as is its more recent compliment the encouragement of democratic electoralism 
in recipient countries. The key problematic from the standpoint of a West that was 
seriously interested in improving well-being in recipient countries is that the call for 
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political liberalism has gone hand-in-hand with the fostering of economic liberalism 
which undermines the capacity of recipient governments to provide the social policy that 
could underpin human rights rhetoric with substantive social rights; 
 
‘The assumption underlying donor’s policy that economic and political 
liberalisation go hand in hand undermined human rights by combining political 
empowerment with economic dis-empowerment, which was reflected in dis-
empowering (and impoverishing) the government, thus ultimately precluding it 
from implementing human rights obligations. The very notion of human rights 
entails corollary government obligations. If a government is unable to raise 
revenue so as to be able to comply with its human rights obligations, human 
rights guarantees become illusory.’ 
 
The upshot of this attempt by the ‘international community’ to foster universal human 
rights and at the same time refuse to redistribute adequate resources from those 
governments that have to those that do not leads to the defence by northern and western 
social democrats of their ideals getting conflated by their southern and eastern critics 
with western free market imperialism wearing a new moral garb of social rights. The 
defence conversely of cultural diversity by some in the South and East then leads to the 
abandonment of a reasoned search for an agreed global form of social progress. 
Notwithstanding all of these powerful arguments and perhaps emboldened by 
the concerted moves to back up the West’s concerns with more resources in the form of 
debt relief etc. there is now a renewed push to assert a) the universalism of human 
rights, b) the social dimension of them, and c) the means by which these global social 
rights could be more effectively realised internationally. The backcloth to this move was 
the intervention by the UK’s Chancellor of the Exchequer to link discussion of the need 
to regulate the flow of international capital with a perceived need to attend to, or rather 
prevent the damaging social consequences of speculative capital flows. He argued for a 
Global Social Policy Code. This would be a ‘code of global best practice in social policy 
which will apply for every country, will set minimum standards and will ensure that 
when IMF and World Bank help a country in trouble the agreed programme of reform 
will preserve investments in the social, education, and employment programmes which 
are essential for growth’ Moreover this code ‘should not be seen in narrow terms as 
merely the creation of social safety nets. We should see it as creating opportunities for all 
by investing more not less in education, employment and vital public services’. (Brown 
1999.) 
It was suggested by him that this code should be agreed at the next meeting of 
the World Bank meeting in spring 1999. The question, therefore, was posed as to who 
and how would this code be devised. However controversy developed concerning which 
international organisation should have the mandate to devise this code of global social 
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policy, the Bank with its concern to claim global expertise on these issues, or the UN 
with its mandate to deal with social policy. The first version produced by the Bank as to 
how to handle this question (March 23rd 1999 for the Committee of the Whole) 
suggested a twin track approach whereby ‘the detailed work on best practices for these 
social policy principles be done as part of a delineated work programme by the World 
Bank’, and that agreement be reached with the UN for then carrying forward this work 
as part of the Copenhagen plus 5 meeting. However the next version (April 9th 1999) for 
presentation to the Development Committee of the Bank shifted clearly the balance of 
responsibilities towards the UN. Its twin track approach now asserted that ‘the UN take 
the lead role..in development of universal principles of social policy”, and the Bank 
would help its member to implement these principles. The final communiqué from the 
April 28th 1999 meeting of the Development Committee noted that Ministers agreed that 
‘further development of the principles of good practice in social policy was best pursued 
within the framework of the United Nations as part of ... the follow-up on ... the World 
Summit on Social Development’. 
The motives for this referral to the UN were more to do with the concern on 
the part of some southern governments that the IMF and Bank would use the new 
principles as a set of social conditions in the context of loans or debt relief than with any 
concern to empower the UN. While some in the UN have welcomed this move others 
have suggested it lets the Bank and Fund off the hook of global social responsibility that 
these principles were designed to facilitate. The danger is that the new global financial 
architecture will be shaped without reference to the social policy principles. Which ever 
view is more accurate it is now for the United Nations and in particular the Preparatory 
Committee for the Copenhagen plus 5 meeting to do the technical work on this. The 
Bank has in its initial deliberations bequeathed a first draft which may be built upon. It 
suggest the principles should be based upon a) achieving universal and equitable access 
to basic social services including access to quality basic education and health care, b) 
enabling all men and women to attain secure and sustainable livelihoods and decent 
working conditions, c) promoting systems of social protection, and d) fostering social 
inclusion. It is the concern of the Social Policy and Social Development secretariat that 
the principles are taken forward in a way which encompasses both the ‘soft’ aspects of 
social policy and the ‘hard’ aspects economic policy. If this were to be an outcome of the 
Copenhagen plus 5 process this might empower the UN in the management of global 
economic and social policy.  
It is timely and appropriate that a background paper aimed at influencing 
these further deliberations has been produced by staff of the UK’s DFID. (Ferguson 
1999). Addressing the topic of Global Social Policy and Human Rights it follows on from 
the view of Rosalind Eyben (1998) that the ‘global architecture of UN conventions, 
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declarations, and world conference documents provide the most authoritative available 
source for the construction of these principles’. In effect the UN documentation provides 
an internationally legitimated set of agreements on social, economic and political issues. 
The contribution by DFID dismisses cultural relativist arguments by reference to these 
international agreements. It also asserts the equal weight of social and economic rights 
alongside civil and political rights. The paper then proceeds to explicate from the raft of 
UN conventions and declarations a set of social policy principles and practices. Social 
policy is here defined as embracing the ‘empowerment’ of people, the ensuring of 
‘livelihood security’, the ‘provision of services’ and efforts which ‘foster social 
integration’. The UN conventions and the series of UN conference agreements are then 
reviewed to generate a set of policies which embrace a) the security of person, b) 
democratic participation, c) civil society, d) minimum livelihood, e) productive 
employment, f) labour standards and g) service provision. 
The coming months will be important in firming these up for adoption at the 
Copenhagen plus 5 meeting. At this stage from the standpoint of the European Union’s 
concern with high quality social provision it is to be hoped that the final code for best 
practice in social policy should not slant too far in the direction of targeting and 
privatisation. It would have to explain what the alternative poles of universalism and 
public responsibility might mean for countries at different levels of development. It is to 
be hoped too that a way can be found of escaping from the view that all the code should 
be concerned with are BASIC education and health services Whether and how the EU 
will make any effective intervention in this process will depend, as we saw in the last 
chapter, on the combination of the Presidency role in steering the intergovernmental 
process at the UN and any input from the Commission in to that. Some suggestions are 
made in the last chapter as to how the EU Presidencies might advance the issue and link 
the new code to real resources so that the sceptical view with which we began this 
section that the West is still just moralising does not prevail. 
 
The EU: Champion of global human but not social rights 
 
We turn now to the track record of the European Union within the global discourse 
about human and social rights. First it is recalled that an element of the common foreign 
and security policy is concerned with human rights. The effectiveness of the Union in 
making this a part of its policy towards other countries will be reviewed. The section 
then turns to the paradox that whereas there has been a concern to present the EU on a 
world stage as a champion of rights when it comes to the codification of rights within 
Europe itself there appears to be vacillation and laggardness.  
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The human rights element of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the 
Union is based on one of the Treaty’s objectives, namely ‘to develop and consolidate 
democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’. As part of the CFSP this means it is primarily the business of the Council of 
Foreign Ministers as was discussed in the last chapter. However the Commission tracks 
and influences policy in this field and presented a review communication on ‘The 
external dimension of human rights policy from Rome to Maastrich and beyond”. In 
practice DG 1A argued, in keeping with the kind of thinking that inspired the recent UK 
DFID paper on Global Social Policy and Social Rights, it is the UN’s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and associated subsequent conventions which guide EU 
policy. In particular it cites the three principles following on from the Universal 
Declaration which were reaffirmed by the international community at the Vienna 
Conference on Human Rights in 1993. These were the universality of rights which 
override national, religious or cultural provision, the indivisibility of rights which 
precludes discrimination between civil and political and economic, social and cultural 
rights, and the interdependence between human rights, democracy and development. It 
argues that these principles also feature in effect in the Luxembourg European Council’s 
declaration of human rights of June 1991.  
The Commission goes to explicate what in practice adherence to these 
principles has meant for the EU in terms of its external relations. A long list mentions 
supporting the transition to democracy, promoting the rule of law, promoting civil 
society, defending independent media, protecting vulnerable groups and minorities, 
promoting peace building measure etc. The list is fairly long on civil and political rights 
and fairly short on social and economic rights. The communication also draws attention 
to the role of the EU as a global actor in the human rights discourse and mentions in 
particular that the ‘Union was a major actor in the negotiation process, speaking with 
one strong and effective voice’ in relation to the Beijing Conference on Women in 1995. 
In terms of the instruments available to the EU to progress this global human right 
policy these follow from the Commission’s communication of 1995 on the inclusion of 
respect for democratic principles and human rights in agreements between the 
Community and third countries. This approach has led to respect for these principles 
being embodied in trade agreements, association agreements and development 
assistance policy. All of this as a policy was effectively reaffirmed by the EU in its 
declaration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the declaration of human rights in 
Vienna in December 1998. This 1998 declaration reaffirms the indivisibility of human 
rights. But all of its subsequent clauses details work and thinking in relation to only civil 
and political rights. Social rights is mentioned only once in relation to the Union’s own 
Charter on Basic Social Right of Workers. 
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There have been a number of recent scholarly evaluations of the role of the EU 
globally in terms of the human rights issue (Smith 1998; Ward 1998; Cremona 1998). 
These focus on whether it is indeed the case, as the Commission claims, that it is taking 
these issue seriously in its international relations. Karen Smith (1998) notes that the EU 
‘has been playing a highly normative role using its economic and diplomatic instruments 
to foster the spread of norms on human rights and democracy’. She ask (253) ‘to what 
extent does the EU actually apply conditionality ... how consistently does it follow its 
own pronouncements?’ The development of the policy outlined in the Commission 
account above is described and en route it is noted that the European Parliament has 
often been in the campaigning seat to strengthen EU resolve on these issues. It has 
become ‘an active promoter of the conditionality norm’. Conditionality, whereby 
countries receive benefits if they conform to certain policies, first appeared as far as the 
EU is concerned in connection with relations with post-communist Eastern Europe 
where trade and co-operation agreements were preferentially given on this basis. The 
PHARE system of aid did not, however, include a conditionality clause as the policy was 
intended to be demand driven by recipient countries. How effective PHARE has been in 
relation to social rights in particular we will return to in a later chapter. Following on 
from this LOME agreements with ACP countries then embodied conditional elements. 
Subsequently conditionality entered into development policy. Trade preferences could 
then also be suspended on human rights grounds. None of these conditionality policies 
seriously addresses social rights. The European Parliament called for including social 
rights in the human rights clause in a resolution of 1994 (OJ 1994, C61), but this was 
regarded as controversial.  
Among the weaknesses of the human rights external dimension as perceived 
by Smith (1998, 274) are the absence of effective reporting mechanisms for evaluating the 
human rights record of EU aid recipients, the variability in pursuing the matter in 
relation to different trade partners… ‘commercial and strategic interests do often trump 
conditionality norms’.  In general a positive assessment is given by Lewis of the extent to 
which the EU has systematically built in human rights considerations to many of its 
external policies. Ward (1998) is less sanguine and points to the discrepancy between a 
more coherent adoption of human rights conditionality in the context of trade 
agreements with developing countries, ex Soviet Union states, Mediterranean basin 
countries, Latin America including MERCUSOR on the one hand and not with EU-USA, 
EU-Canada, EU-Australia relations on the other hand. Relations with China and with 
ASEAN are said to be progressing ahead without the presence of human rights clauses. 
In sum (Ward 1998, 527) ‘potential for punishment of human rights abuse is imposed on 
some less developed areas of the world’. For our purpose what comes through most 
clearly however is the lack of attention, despite the rhetoric of the indivisibility of rights, 
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to social rights, a weakness in the external dimension of EU’s social policy to which we 
shall return in the last chapter. 
Paradoxically while the EU sees itself as a major player on the global stage 
campaigning for indivisible human rights its approach to these issues when it comes to 
European citizens and residents leaves a lot to be desired. Certainly the lack of progress 
in codifying a comprehensive set of social rights of EU citizens is has been noted by 
many commentators. Gearty’s (1997) volume on European Civil Liberties and the 
European Convention on Human Rights is the most systematic review of the issues 
surrounding this question. The story is one that is complicated by the parallel existence 
of the EU and the Council of Europe. The European Convention on Human Rights which 
is the basis for the judicial proceedings of the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg 
focuses on civil and political rights and does not address social rights. The EU is not a 
legal signatory to this but it is accepted as a basis of the Maastrich Treaty. Alongside the 
European Convention is the recently modified European Social Charter which covers 
most of the aspects of social rights that one would want to see in a global set of social 
rights. Countries can choose however which elements they sign up to and can exclude 
quite central ones. The recently improved reporting procedures does allow for collective 
complaints and is a potential source of political pressure for them being met in practice. 
In terms of the EU all that exists is the Charter on the Fundamental Rights of Workers 
produced in 1989. Even this is soft law which is not binding.  
The absence of a charter of social rights for European citizens has lead to much 
discussion, but little action to remedy the situation. Stephen Hughes, MEP, speaking at 
the European Social Policy Forum in June 1998 complained ‘that social rights could only 
sneak their way into the Amsterdam Treaty by means of a reference to the Community 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of Workers. We are very far away from the incorporation 
of specific social rights.’ The Comite de Sages set up under the Commission’s guidance 
in 1996 argued in its report for a Europe of Civic and Social Rights. In terms of social 
rights it felt that progress might be assured by distinguishing between a)rights which 
could be enshrined in law now because they were implied by community law already, 
such as equal treatment, b) rights which could also be encoded in law as they were 
needed to facilitate economic integration such as the right to choose ones profession, 
thirdly c) would be a set of rights which might be aspired to. Their list (Comite de Sages 
1996, 51) reflects some of the same items as on the Council of Europe’s Social Charter: the 
right to lifelong education, work or minimum income, health and safety, health care, 
housing, social security, etc. The proposal of Gerty (1997) in relation to EU social rights 
was to simply adopt the Council of Europe’s Social Charter, leaving the Court of Human 
Rights to cover civil and political rights. Pieters and Nickless considered these issues 
(1998) and came down in favour of some set of EU social rights. The initiative of the 
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German Presidency on this matter is taking time to produce results although there is an 
expert working party associated with DG 5 who have just finished working on this topic 
(European Commission 1999c). The report of this working group is very affirmative 
about the need to incorporate an express guarantee of rights into the Treaty. It suggests, 
to the contrary of Gerty, that this should be based on the European Convention of 
Human Rights. The Luxembourg European Court of Justice should integrate the 
decisions of the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights into the law of the EU. This does not 
address or advance the issue of social rights at all. The report makes no mention of the 
Council of Europe’s Social Charter. The working party was actually charged with 
examining the implications of the notion of the indivisibility of rights but in a short 
section the report lamely calls for the need to formulate new social rights where these 
can not be derived from an interpretation of civil rights. This suggests that the German 
initiative might not advance the cause of embodying social rights within the EU treaty.  
Declaring social rights leads to the question as to whether they are covered by 
soft law which only requires countries to realise them if possible, or hard law whereby 
an individual could take her country to court, in this case the ECJ in Luxembourg, for not 
meeting her rights. The reason, of course for slow progress within Europe or elsewhere 
in making a set of social rights hard law are the resource implications implied and the 
differential capacity of governments to provide these resources. Despite these problems 
the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights called for the creation of an optional 
complaints procedure under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights whereby individuals or groups could bring claims of violation of 
economic and social rights before an impartial body. The need to link rights or standards 
to resource redistribution lies at the heart of the European project which through its 
structural fund and concept of a level playing field depends on redistribution, regulation 
and empowerment. The same issue surfaces within Europe as it does at a global level. 
What level of social rights or standards could be agreed on with an associated set of 
transnational resource commitments which is on the one hand high enough to be 
meaningful but on the other hand low enough to be affordable without at the same time 
it being so low as to implicitly threaten higher standards elsewhere. Hine and Kassim 
(1998; 57) linked the issue of social rights and resources with the EU political process 
quite nicely when they concluded:  
 
‘(An) appropriate and feasible role of the EU in this context is to establish a 
floor of standards at a level acceptable to the majority of member states; 
ensure that inequalities that cannot be resolved by redistribution policies 
within member states are met with by pan-European transfers, and help 
implement a set of ‘best practices’ policies and facilitate a process of con-
sensual national adjustment’ 
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The European Union regards itself as an important actor on the international stage 
campaigning for global human rights. It has established a set of instruments for trying to 
bring global change about. There is controversy about whether some of these 
instruments such as linking trade and aid to conditions are desirable. There is 
controversy about whether it treats all countries fairly in these matters. Despite the 
rhetoric linking all human rights together the overwhelming emphasise of policy and 
action avoids the issue of social rights. Even within its own borders it has yet to tackle 
the adoption of a set of social rights even as soft law. Yet among the member states the 
UK has emerged as a major player in the international arena with UK DFID thinking 
through the implications of UN conventions for an imminent global code of social rights. 
It remains to be seen within the intergovernmental process leading up to the 
Copenhagen plus 5 meeting whether the EU as a bloc will effectively contribute to the 
first ever adoption of a set of global social policy principles, whether the content of those 
principles will reflect the universalistic aspirations of most of Europe or will settle for a 
more basic and targeted approach which would be more in keeping with the Anglo-
American tradition.   
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CHAPTER FIVE: MOVING SOCIAL POLICY UP THE DEVELOPMENT 
AGENDA 
 
While the quantity of aid flowing from north to south has been reduced in the past 
decade in terms of a percentage of GNP in almost all countries there has been concerted 
international effort to make more effective use of this aid, to focus more of it on social 
aspects of development including health and education, to win the co-operation of 
developing countries’ to this project in terms of, for example the 20:20 initiative which 
would ensure that 20 % of aid is for social purposes and 20 % of developing countries 
public expenditure matches this. Targets which are believed to be attainable have been 
set by the major donors. As a contribution to this there is the real prospect of significant 
debt relief at the Millennium not attached to structural adjustment conditions. In this 
chapter we review some of the controversy around these developments in development 
policy, and then examine how the EU’s track record and policy on these issues measures 
up. 
 
Attainable development targets: global social progress or legitimating residual social 
policy?     
 
International Development Co-operation has moved a long way from the days of socially 
irresponsible structural adjustment programmes overseen by the Bank and IMF with no 
concern with the short term negative social consequences of such adjustment. 
Responding to the criticisms of global civil society and UN agencies the Bank first 
articulated a concern for poverty alleviation in this context in 1990. At that point the 
dominant aid paradigm was broad based growth, basic social services and safety nets. 
Many argued that while marking some progress this represented the institutionalisation 
globally of a residual approach to social policy and provision. Earlier (Deacon 1997) I 
showed that the focus of the development lobby upon the poorest of the poor often lead 
to a challenge in some countries to tripartite welfare settlements with urban workers that 
had been developed in an earlier period of import substitution or what some call now 
premature state building. While it was true that the PAYG social security provisions of 
Latin America and the state pensions of Indian and African civil servants were available 
only to a relatively privileged sector and that ways of extending these rights to the 
informal sector of employment are only now being addressed (van Ginneken 1998) it 
could be argued they provided a sounder and potentially more acceptable universal 
basis upon which to build than the individualised and privatised savings accounts 
which, under the pressures of structural adjustment are now being developed. The Bank 
was quite clear in its approach to social policy in such countries (Graham 1994; Deacon 
1997) that an alliance could be struck between itself, the excluded poor and the 
 - 43 - 
 
International NGOs and development lobby to bypass and let wither these incipient 
welfare states in favour of a targeted and residualised safety net approach to social 
policy. Moreover with a focus on safety nets with which it saw eye to eye with 
development lobbies it could move on from there to co-opt NGOs into delivering social 
funds to the poor within the framework of this New Policy Agenda (Edwards and 
Hulme 1995, Fowler 1996). Structural adjustment and debt burden had crippled the 
nascent welfare role of the state and laid the ground for a safety net approach within 
which INGOs would have a role and self interest. 
It remains to be seen if in the wake of the argument by Stiglitz (1998) that there 
is now a need to rethink the Washington Consensus whether thinking and policy within 
the Bank on social development issues and social policy issues does move further from 
liberalism with safety nets. There are mixed messages. The first draft of the World Bank’s 
WDR-2001 on poverty (www.worldbank.org/devforum) has proposed a four prong 
approach which involves empowerment, security, opportunity and international 
structural issues. In the section dealing with unemployment insurance, however, there is 
still to be found the obsession with targeting on the poor. The current draft reads ‘the 
key issue. Is to design (these schemes) so that they maintain their function of providing 
insurance for the very poor and are not captured by the not so poor”. At the same time 
Wolfenson’s proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework (Wolfensohn 1999) 
covers good governance, an effective legal system, supervised financial systems but 
when it approaches the social dimension it still talks in terms of safety nets and the 
emphases in education and health policy is on universal primary education and 
communal and local level health services. On the positive side the draft does not come 
down firmly on the side of higher levels of education and health care being privately 
provided. In terms of the work of the Social Protection section of the Human 
Development Network in the Bank the current draft (Holzmann and Jorgensen 1999) of 
the emerging policy paper does acknowledge that there may be a case for income 
redistribution between income cohorts, between generations and between nations and 
regions, but the main thrust of the analytical work is that of enabling individuals and 
families to protect themselves from risk through a risk management strategy. In terms of 
income maintenance policy the interim conclusions of the draft are not suprising and in 
keeping with the market orientation of the Bank., This analysis the paper argues ‘fosters 
the importance of ... multi-pillar pension systems, individual social accounts to handle 
multiple risks (unemployment, sickness, disability, survivorship, old-age)’ and ‘puts the 
role of government in perspective: governments have an important role for the 
establishing and functioning of informal and market-based arrangements; governments 
and public administration also have their own agenda, exposing such arrangements to 
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political risk.” Hardly a rally cry for sound universal publicly provided services financed 
out of redistributive taxation! 
It should not be taken for granted then that the new fashion in International 
Development Co-operation for setting achievable development targets is unalloyed 
global social progress. Certainly from the standpoint of Social Policy Ministries in 
Europe many would be very worried if some of the logic that inspired these moves in 
social development policy towards the south were to be applied towards social policy in 
the north. The OECD:DAC (1997) report Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of 
Development Co-operation set a number of targets for development policy. This lead to 
a joint venture between DAC, bilateral donors and the World Bank to establish 
indicators of progress towards their achievement (http://www.oecd.org/dac/ 
indicators). 
The OECD:DAC (1997) targets which are ones thought to be realisable by 2015 
focus on the poorest of the poor in poor countries. These targets include the halving of 
the number of people in extreme poverty, making basic education available to all girls 
and boys, enabling access for all to reproductive health services, with concomitant 
reductions in maternal and infant mortality rates and gender inequality. The two 
positives in this approach are the inclusion in the agreed measures of poverty of one 
indicator of inequality (the poorest fifth’s share of national consumption), which suggest 
that redistribution policies are not forgotten entirely and the fact that measurable and 
attainable targets and the monitoring of them are in place. The other side of the coin 
remains the limited goal in terms of public service provision of universal primary 
education and universal reproductive health. This leaves ample scope for the 
privatisation of the rest of social provision while international attention is focused on 
these issues of basic service delivery only.  
 
Obstacles to a progressive north-south social policy and social development dialogue 
 
The view of concerned aid workers that insist that in the absence of government 
provision then some kind of NGO assisted targeted social fund is preferable to nothing is 
hard to challenge. Equally the view that says while resources are limited then public 
money should be spent on primary and not secondary education is hard to fault. The 
same applies to priority expenditure on basic health services. The views only become 
open to challenge when the implications are thought through in terms of the 
consequential development of privileged and private provision of secondary and tertiary 
education and of private hospital care. The siphoning off into the global market of 
private medicine and the global market in higher education of the elite of these countries 
could destroy for ever the interclass solidarity that would be needed to fashion over the 
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longer haul an adequate universal education and health system and system of social 
protection for all. What defenders of a residualised approach to social development in 
the south have to show is how this strategy will lead over the next decades to an 
acceptable set of public provisions at all levels for all. The table below sets out some of 
the obstacles that get in the way of a progressive north-south dialogue on these matters. 
 
Figure 5.1.  Obstacles to a progressive north-south dialogue on social policy and social 
development 
 
a) Targeting and Safety Nets  
SOUTH NORTH 
Could be OK as better than nothing.  INGOs 
have  a role to play in implementing them. 
Resources are limited and we have to have 
distribution equity as measured by the 
Bank’s beneficiary index. 
Earlier formal universal social security was 
available only to a privileged working or 
civil service class. 
Directly challenge the universalism of 
European tradition in favour of USA 
residualism. 
It is necessary that the middle class also 
benefit from social spending in order to 
ensure a willingness to be taxed. 
 
 
b) Basic Education and Health 
SOUTH 
Resource limitations dictate priorities. 
Health and participation are basic human 
needs . 
Tertiary education and hospital health was 
used only by the elite. 
NORTH 
Limiting state provision to these leaves the 
rest: secondary education, tertiary 
education and hospital care to be privatised 
which feeds the global market in private 
social welfare which undermines European 
tradition 
c) NGOs are making an important contribution 
SOUTH NORTH 
Many Gov. in Africa and elsewhere were 
corrupt.  
Civil society was underdeveloped. 
NGOs can mobilise new resources and 
involve the poor.   
Governments have a responsibility to 
universalise good local initiatives. 
Key questions of social policy about 
resource priorities can only be settled by 
government. 
 
 
The disjuncture in policy approaches at the level of articulated strategies is fortunately 
probably greater than the reality on the ground. However much, for example, the World 
Bank insist that the use by the middle class of public hospitals is a non equitable use of 
resources they continue in India and elsewhere to do so. Recent data from a number of 
countries (Gwatkin 1999) suggests that the richest 20 % of the population in these 
countries only use public health facilities a little bit less than the poorest 20 %. The 
professional middle class in most of the countries we are concerned with are not able to 
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afford private hospital care. The same applies to higher education in may countries. The 
picture is rather different though in some Asian and Latin American countries. 
As debt relief approaches and the search for ways of ensuring that the liberated 
funds are spent on social welfare gets more urgent these issues take on more importance. 
They are linked closely to the emerging code of global principles for social policy 
discussed in chapter four. At stake is whether at the start of the next century the world 
lines up behind a set of best practices for social policy fashioned out of the immediate 
contingencies of a south made poor by the north which reflect a residualist orientation 
dominant in the USA or whether it learns from and applies to the task of social 
development the lessons of the European struggle for social welfare that only 
universalistic and inclusive approaches to social provision ensure stability, peace, 
security and social well-being for all. We examine the contribution of Europe’s aid policy 
and practice etc. in the light of this below. 
 
EU International Development Assistance is fragmented and lacks a coherent social 
dimension? 
 
There is no shortage of recent reviews of the extent and direction of European 
Community Aid. The British Overseas Development Institute (ODI) initiated a scholarly 
appraisal of the aid programmes of a large number of European countries and that of the 
EC in 1996. The EC study (Loquai, Hove and Bossuyt 1998) and the comparative 
synthesis of all the donors (Cox, Healey and Voipio 1999) are particularly relevant to our 
purpose, although the EC study excludes consideration of aid to the Mediterranean 
countries, Eastern Europe and the NIS and also aid channelled through the humanitarian 
office ECHO. Many of the same researchers were then co-opted by the OCED:DAC’s 
working group on poverty reduction to provide an appraisal of the EC and of the World 
Bank, UNDP, and IMF as well as several European country aid policies. Again the 
OECD:DAC study of the EC (Paccound 1998) excluded aid to eastern Europe and the 
work of ECHO. The synthesis report (Cox et al 1998) of all of these studies usefully sets 
the EC role in comparative perspective and also assesses the effectiveness of targeted 
verses more universalistic approaches to poverty reduction. At the same time as part of 
its regular peer review the OECD:DAC (1998) recently completed its Aid Review of the 
European Commission. The EU Development Council itself also commissioned a 
number of internal evaluations of aspects of EC aid focusing in turn on aid to the ACP 
countries, Asia and Latin American countries, Mediterranean countries, and 
humanitarian aid through ECHO. The first of these is now available (European 
Commission 1999a) and the others and the synthesis report are now being made 
available. The Development Council of the EU gave initial consideration to these on May 
21st 1999. The monitoring of the Commission’s implementation of the Council’s views 
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will take place during the Finnish Presidency. The UK has been particularly active in 
assessing the EC aid programmes (DFID 1998) which has given rise to particular 
recommendations which will be reported below. Previous work by the author assessing 
the impact of the EU PHARE and TACIS programmes for support to Eastern Europe and 
the NIS complimented these sources. (Deacon 1997.) 
All of these reviews have very similar things to say about European 
Community Aid much of which is quite critical. The critical comments may be 
summarised in the following list. European Community aid is regarded as: 
 Suffering from fragmentation of responsibility and delivery leading to a failure of 
consistency or co-ordination between programmes; 
 Embodying unjustified different policy approaches to different regions; 
 Having grown in size in contrast to decline in most country aid budgets but many 
funds committed are not spent; 
 Not focused on the poorest countries: country allocation is shaped by geopolitical 
considerations; 
 Having fine resolutions on poverty alleviation as a goal but lacking practical policy 
steps and professional capacity to realise this goal effectively in practice; 
 Attempting to link trade preferences for labour and social standards with aid for at 
least ACP countries through the LOME agreements but with little effect and suspect 
motivations; 
 Suffering from a failure of the Commission to drive particular EU views on poverty 
alleviation or desirable social protection measures into projects because of the way 
the subcontracting mode is used; 
 Suffering from a number of other institutional shortcomings within the Commission 
and between it and other donors and the recipient governments. 
 
These comments are examined in more detail below. The question of how trade and aid 
issues are linked will be addressed in the next chapter. Given the lack of development 
policy coherence evident in the above it is not to be expected that we will find the EU in 
the forefront of a global discussion as to whether the OCED:DAC targets do embody a 
slide towards legitimating residualism. It is equally unlikely that we will find effective 
dialogue between the social policy secretariat of the Commission and the diverse 
component parts of the Commission responsible for the fragmented aid programme. The 
case of aid to Eastern Europe will provide a partial exception to this. These points will be 
returned to later. 
The pattern of responsibility is captured partly by the following table showing 
the division of labour within the Commission (based on Loquai, Hove and Bossuyt 
1998). 
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Figure 5.2. Responsibility for EU development assistance 
 
DIRECTORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
DG 8.Directorate General for Development  Co-operation with ACP countries 
Aid from Community budget line for all 
countries. 
 
DG 1A. Directorate General for External 
Relations 
Co-operation with CEES and NIS etc. 
PHARE, CONSENSUS,TACIS,   
 
DG 1B. Directorate General for External 
Relations  
Co-operation with Mediterranean, Middle 
East, Latin America and Asian countries. 
 
DG 1, Directorate General for External 
Relations 
External relations to Far East 
WTO negotiations 
 
ECHO.  Humanitarian aid budget 
 
SCR. Common Services Execution of all external projects 
 
 
The SCR or central common services is a new directorate being established in 1999 to 
respond to some of the criticisms which are expressed below about the excessive focus 
on the administration of subcontracting etc. previously taking up the time of all of the 
other Directorates to the detriment of the clarification of policy orientation. 
The aid budget itself is made up of one component (approximately 60 % 
between 1986 and 1995) which is part of the EC budget subject to parliamentary scrutiny 
and a part, (approximately 40 % in the same period) made up of the European 
Development Fund (EDF) which is voted for by countries and managed by the 
Development Council of Ministers. Apart from the question of internal fragmentation of 
responsibility there is the matter of how the EC does or does not agree a division of 
labour with Member Country aid budgets. Some countries would be willing to see this 
development others not. Within this context of fragmentation and also because of some 
of the other shortcomings in European policy clarity on social development issues the 
UK Parliament’s International Development Select Committee recently (29th Jan 1999) 
reported on EC aid and concluded. ‘The only way to ensure that development priorities 
receive due attention ... is to create a separate Directorate General for Development with 
exclusive responsibility for official development assistance ... responsible both for 
budgetised EC aid and the EDF’. This is the view of UK’s DFID which not only wishes to 
see such a unified directorate but also better policy linkages within the EC to other policy 
areas such as trade (DFID 1998). 
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A positive feature of EU aid compared with that of many individual countries 
is that it has increased in size over recent years. In the past three decades it has more 
than tripled as a share of all OECD aid. It is now the world’s fifth largest donor and 
taken together with member country bilateral aid it accounted for 60 % of world aid in 
1995 (Cox and Konning 1997). Over the past decade net ODA disbursements by the 
Union grew at an annual rate of 5.3 % in real terms compared with an annual decline of 
0.8 % for all OECD countries. Set against this trend is the concern that the gap between 
commitments and actual disbursements has grown considerably. Between 1992 and 1996 
the gap between the two exceeded $1,600 million dollars each year (OECD DAC 1998). 
Within the total amount of EC aid disbursed there has been a consistent increase 
between 1986 and 1995 in the share of aid going to support the social infrastructure 
including the health and education sectors. This increased from 3.4 % of aid in 1986 to 
12.0 % in 1995. Humanitarian aid increased also dramatically in this period rising form 
3.1 % to 15.2 % not least because of the crisis in former Yugoslavia. (Loquai, Hove and 
Bossuyt 1998.) 
A major concern of most critical commentaries has however been whether the 
aid distribution matches up to words about the policy of focusing aid on alleviating 
poverty in the world. Article 130u of the 1993 treaty set out the objectives of 
development co-operation as including ‘the campaign against poverty in developing 
countries” and ‘social development in ... especially the most disadvantaged ones”. Two 
Development Council resolutions in 1993 and 1996 explicated the meaning of this is 
certain ways. In 1996 the resolution on Human and Social Development suggested that 
concerted action was required under four headings; human empowerment and 
participation, economic framework conducive to growth and employment generation, 
health and education/training. However in practice the trend in aid to countries has 
moved away from helping the most poor countries. In the 1980s 80 % of assistance from 
the EC was focused on the least developed countries but by 1993/4 the least-developed 
countries were receiving only 38 % of EC aid and low income countries were receiving a 
mere 15 % of aid (Loquai et al 1998). According to the UK DFID ‘these trends in resource 
allocation are highly undesirable and constrain the EC’s contribution to the international 
poverty eradication strategy’ (DFID 1998). The OECD:DAC (1998) peer evaluation 
comments that ‘lip service to the poverty goal will no longer suffice. Additional work is 
required by the EU… to strengthen policy and implementation with respect to gender, 
human rights, participation, and partnership’. The OECD:DAC (Paccound 1998) poverty 
working group study of the EC noted that ‘The absence of strict and clear agency 
guidelines for introducing poverty reduction programmes and projects has forced the 
Commission staff to very intuitive approaches’ Within the context of the EU-ACP 
(European Commission 1999a) relations the internal evaluation of EC aid comments that 
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‘The Commission has been focused not on achieving results-on reducing poverty-but on 
administrative procedures’. This is partly a problem of the lack of professional social 
development staff and other aspects of internal EC procedure which we will return to, 
later. 
Part of the problem of lack of coherent policy orientation towards the key task 
of using aid to reduce global poverty is the geographical arrangement of the aid budget. 
Different practices and procedures have grown up and different priorities exist for 
different areas of the world. While some differences in focus are sensible because of the 
different levels of development of the countries involved others exist for historic or 
geopolitical reasons which have little to do with a coherent geographically nuanced 
social development policy focused on the poor. In the case of the Asian and Latin 
American and Mediterranean countries poverty alleviation as a goal and strategy is ‘far 
less homogeneous’ (Paccound 1998) and other factors influence aid priorities. 
In the case of the Mediterranean countries a focus is the development of 
employment with a view also to the establishment of a common trade bloc. Corruption 
within the Commission has also influenced policy (Committee of Independent Experts 
1999). Future membership of the EU shapes aid priorities to Eastern Europe. Trade 
considerations and potential contracts for EU firms continue to influence aid to some 
parts of Asia and Latin America. In the case of the ACP countries whose special 
relationship to the EU is shaped by the colonial legacy a more focused concern with 
poverty alleviation could be said to be present. From the time of the first LOME 
convention in 1975 EC aid was seen as an entitlement of the ACP countries who could 
shape the use of it as they saw fit. By the time of the third LOME convention agreed in 
1985 there was a ‘slow move away from entitlement … and this facilitated the 
incorporation into the LOME conventions of priority objectives such as the reduction of 
poverty and democracy and the protection of human rights’ (European Commission 
1997). 
A move towards conditionality was more evident in LOME IV and IV b. in the 
context of structural adjustment by the World Bank and IMF. In practice the evaluation 
study argued that the use of conditionality ‘involves a more flexible policy dialogue with 
recipient countries (than the Bank or Funds)’. The EU-ACP evaluation by the 
Commission suggest a move to a genuine partnership with firm commitments by ACP 
countries re good governance etc. matched by firm responsibilities of the EC. This move 
away from simplistic structural adjustment-type conditionality to a partnership 
agreement is important to note. Here positive conditionality designed to improve social 
policy in recipient countries is secured through ownership by the recipient government 
of the policy coupled with financial support from the donors to facilitate the policy in the 
context of meaningful dialogue. This move chimes with the recommendations of Killick 
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(1998) at the conclusion of his massive study of the shortcomings of old-fashioned 
conditionality. One important element of the development policy towards ACP countries 
is the explicit link to trade policies both in terms of the generalised systems of 
preferences which grant ACP countries access to the EU market for many of their goods 
and the additional trade tariff bonuses available to countries that meet certain ILO 
labour standards etc. 
This triangulation of freeing trade as a reward for meeting standards achieved 
partly by a focused aid policy might be seen as the EU practising what we argued in 
chapter two was needed to secure greater global social justice, namely redistribution 
working with regulation and empowerment. However others have argued that the 
prime motive for the trade preferences is to provide Europe with cheap raw materials 
and products which do not threaten the subsidised goods produced by the Common 
Agricultural Policy and that by not using aid to facilitate other economic development 
the EU is conserving colonial production practices of benefit to Europe. This view 
notwithstanding the ODI evaluation (Loquai, Hove and Bossuyt 1998) of the EU aid 
programme noted in relation to the future of LOME that ‘The Commission’s draft 
mandate for the upcoming negotiations looks promising. It contains a clear Commitment 
to poverty eradication as the priority objective”. This aspect of linking trade to social 
conditions we shall return to in the next chapter when the future of LOME will be 
considered in the context of current EU policy towards it and the WTO forthcoming 
round of trade negotiations.  
In the case of aid and technical assistance to Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union the first interim evaluation of the PHARE and TACIS programme used by 
the EU to assist the transition concluded that ‘the decentralised implementation 
approach has resulted in a tendency for the Commission to contract out expertise in the 
transition process and retain in-house expertise in financial and administrative 
procedures, thereby loosing grip on the substance and impact of the programmes. 
Internal human resource constraints, high staff turnover with concomitant poor 
institutional memory and little accumulation of experience, have all exacerbated this 
tendency. In a limited number of case, this may have lead to ‘contractor driven’ 
programmes’. (Commission 1997a 53.) A related concern was the ‘lack of prior sector 
analysis and strategic vision’ (52). This failure of the EU to use PHARE and TACIS as 
vehicles for driving through a European vision of social policy and poverty alleviation 
has been contrasted sharply with the relative systematic zeal with which the World Bank 
has used the transition to argue for targeted and residualist social policy and by the ILO 
to argue systematically for tripartite managed systems of social security (Deacon 1997). 
What social policy advice countries got from the PHARE and TACIS system reflected to 
some extent the predilections of the subcontracted consultancy company. Once 
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subcontracted by the EU little was done to suggest to the firms that they should in some 
way carry EU social policy with them in their work. This shortcoming was in part due to 
the lack of clarity on the part of the EU as to what model of social policy it would be 
selling. At the same time the percentage of PHARE and TACIS aid being used for social 
purposes is very small. 
This situation has been improved somewhat by the newer CONSENSUS 
programme operating within the framework of PHARE which was explicitly designed to 
enable countries to shape their social protection systems with an eye to membership of 
the EU. The funds available to CONSENSUS, however, are very small. A normal PHARE 
project in one country averages 3MEUR while the total allocation to CONSENSUS for 
twelve countries for 1995-1999 was 20MEUR. Since 1998, however, the Commission has 
been able to raise the profile of the social dimension of accession. For example at a 
meeting of the Programme Advisory Board of CONSENSUS attended by applicant states 
on Dec. 18th 1998 the Commission argued that ‘Our social protection systems are 
distinguished by their universal nature and by the extent of their social support” (and 
that) ‘a commitment to high social standards (on the part of the applicant countries) will 
cement political support for enlargement’ (Larsson 1998a). This is the only example in 
our survey of a particular European perspective on social policy influencing the external 
development policy of the Union. The profile of this exception was raised recently at the 
Labour and Social Affairs Council (March 1999) when it was agreed in summing up by 
the German Presidency that social policy must become a fifth compulsory priority area 
in PHARE from 2000. This may be achieved by absorbing the CONSENSUS programme 
into it. At the same time since 1998 PHARE has been accession driven giving more scope 
to the EU to shape projects. Our question remains whether the perception of EU 
Ministers of Social Policy and the Commission which already recognises that the way 
social policy is unfolding in Eastern Europe is important for the future of EU social 
policy can be stretched to appreciate that this might in the context of globalization also 
apply to social policy in other regions of the world.     
A brief comment on the Emergency Humanitarian work of the EC is need to 
complete the survey. ECHO was established in 1992 in the context of emergencies close 
to or in Europe in order to speed emergency humanitarian relief to crisis situations. The 
creation of a new directorate may have enabled the process to be speeded up but it yet 
further complicated the relationship to the rest of  EC effort in the same regions. About 
50 % of ECHO’s support to crisis regions is channelled through NGOs. Problems of 
financial accounting and transparency and the questionable legal basis of some of the 
funds spent under this EC budget head have been an object of concern. From the point of 
view of our concern that the EU contribute to the establishment elsewhere of sound 
governmental responsibility for social policy and provision the heavy if understandable 
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reliance of ECHO on INGOs raises questions. These were evident in the work of ECHO 
in Bosnia where even though there were in place entity and canton level Ministers able 
and willing to improve social provision and build on the basis of past Yugoslavian 
practice much of the work of ECHO, and indeed other donors bypassed the local 
administration and established parallel structures which in turn demoralised 
government agencies who saw funds they needed being siphoned elsewhere. (Deacon 
and Stubbs 1998). Worrying again was the absence of any strategy on the part of the 
ECHO office in Sarajevo to ensure that with the end of the war and the beginning of 
reconstruction the other EU agencies and programmes such as PHARE were brought 
systematically into the frame.   
In much of the above it is clear that all of the evaluations of EU development 
policy are suggesting that one of the reasons for failure to follow through on fine 
pronouncements is the lack of capacity within the Commission to do this or that failure 
is due in some other way to institutional problems. The lack of sufficient social 
development profession staff is mentioned often and the absence of firm leadership on 
these policy issues is noted. No guidelines are given to enable subcontractors to adopt 
EU policy in their practice. Internal evaluations which focus on effectiveness have only 
just begun within DG 8. Overriding all of this is however the concern with the 
fragmented organisation. The OECD:DAC (Paccound 1998) peer review concludes that ‘a 
divided organisational framework has lead to a splintered policy framework ... (with) ... 
no coherent Commission wide development strategy…(which means) the Commission 
must pay a heavy price in efficiency and effectiveness’. Clearly this takes us back to the 
case for a unified DG for all development policy. 
The initial review of these evaluations of EU aid by the Development Council 
on May 21st (EU Development Council 1999) appears to have steered clear of discussing 
the need for a unified DG but did resolve very clearly the need for the Commission to 
devise a ‘strategic up-to-date statement on development policy ... (which) should create 
an overall profile of EC’s development co-operation...(and which)...should ensure total 
coherence between development co-operation and the common foreign and security 
policy as well as external economic policy...(This would)...strengthen the focus of EC’s 
aid and contribute to increased complementarity between the Community and the 
Member States in development co-operation’. The Commission is to devise such a policy 
statement during 1999 to be ready in draft by the first half of 2000. The meeting of the 
Development Council in November 1999 will review progress.  
Finally we need to consider where this leaves the desired objective of Europe 
playing a role in the world of helping to usher in a socially responsible globalization 
which is based on a set of global social policies which flow from the positive experiences 
of European social policy. It returns us to the question as to whether the 
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OECD:DAC/World Bank strategy that the EC is being asked to pay closer attention to of 
focusing aid on the poor and on only basic provision is a slide into legitimating 
residualism in social policy globally. One of the OECD:DAC evaluations attempts to 
synthesise the evaluations of EU country policies with those of the World Bank the 
UNDP and the EC and make comparisons (Cox et al 1998). It notes that ‘When weighing 
up the relative merits of universal versus targeted approaches, there is some merit in 
differentiating between basic service provision and interventions in the productive 
sectors (e.g. agricultural, fisheries, manufacturing) ... With respect to the provision of 
basic services such as primary health care or education, it may well be that the long term 
benefit of the poorest is best served by providing good quality services on a population 
wide basis. If basic health and education services are exclusively targeted at the poorest, 
the ‘not-so-poor’ will have to secure access through private routes. This may undermine 
their willingness to pay taxes, yet taxation is likely to provide the most sustainable 
financing for services’. This is not unimportant and chimes with the sentiments 
expressed by the Commission when addressing the social development strategy for 
Eastern Europe. From the European experience there is no reason to stop at an argument 
for universalism in relation to just basic education and health. A European Development 
goal should encompass European social policy objectives at all levels. It is to be hoped 
that in devising a new European Development policy the Commission take the 
opportunity to reflect again on the relationship between internal EU social policy and 
external social development policy so that the resulting policy is not just a restatement of 
OECD:BANK policy targeting provision on the poor and the basic but engages critically 
with it on the issue of basic verses higher level provision and targeting versus 
universalism.  
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CHAPTER SIX: INJECTING SOCIAL CONCERNS INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
 
Moves towards declaring a global set of social rights (chapter 4) or towards a focus on 
universalistic social provision in development co-operation (chapter 5) will contribute 
little to the task of creating a socially responsible globalization unless they are 
complimented by consistent effort to bring global economic processes into line with 
these concerns. This is a broad topic embracing the regulation of speculative financial 
flows, the injection of a social dimension into world and bilateral trade, taking into 
account social policy in international agreements on investment, ensuring TNCs adopt a 
socially responsible investment strategy, and reforming the global tax structures both to 
eliminate tax competition and to raise global revenues for global social purposes. This 
chapter reviews progress within the global debate on these topics and then turns to an 
assessment of the EU’s contribution to the elements of the debate. 
 
Snails progress towards inserting a social purpose in the global economy  
 
Despite the negative social consequences of the Asian and other financial crises brought 
about in part by speculative capital flows finding a global agreement about what is to be 
done has been painfully slow. The question of moves to reduce short term speculative 
flows by taxing them we shall examine later in this section. There is general agreement 
that some kind of regulation of the Banking sectors in economies prone to speculation is 
needed but how this is to be done and with what instruments is far from clear. The IMF 
has articulated a concern to give more attention to protecting the poor in the context of 
its supervision of the economies of countries. Michel Camdessus (1999) has argued that 
good governance at national level ‘will have to be rounded off with a firm commitment 
to sound social and human development policies’, and that he supported ‘the call (of the 
G-7 Ministers of Finance) for the development of a set of general principles of good 
practice in social polices which we discussed in chapter four. Elsewhere (IMF 1998) the 
IMF has argued that ‘regard for the human costs involved in adjustment is essential if 
adjustment efforts are to be successful’. UK’s Gordon Brown has argued that a 
surveillance unit be established within the IMF charged with ensuring countries 
complied with four codes of conduct, on financial, fiscal policy and corporate 
governance and social policy (Guardian 22 April 1999). He wanted these codes brought 
within the remit of IMF’s article 4 consultations which are held with all 182 member 
countries. This would enable the charge that the codes would be a new form of 
conditionality directed only at some countries to be refuted. The Interim Committee of 
the IMF on April 27th 1999 welcomed progress on the development of codes of practice 
on fiscal transparency, on monetary and financial transparency, on corporate governance 
and other aspects of the banking and insurance sectors. It did not, however, receive the 
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code for social policy as this went the next day to the Development Committee of the 
World Bank as we mentioned in chapter four. The Bank then referred it to the UN. In 
chapter four we noted that this might have the effect of letting the IMF of the hook of 
considering social issues in its advice to government.  
Within this context and that of imminent debt relief OXFAM while expressing 
concern about the IMF scrutiny of countries has argued that countries who, for example, 
spend 85-100 % of their debt relief on health and social services and poverty relief 
should, be rewarded with further relief more quickly (OXFAM 1998). This may look like 
global progress but on the other hand the report of the Task Force of the Executive 
Committee on Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations (UN 1999) asserts that 
‘(IMF) conditionality should not include issues related to economic and social 
development ... which ... should be decided by legitimate national authorities’. The 
global debate is complicated by the struggle between the UN and the Bank/IMF for 
control of global social policy. Moves such as the agreement that the UN should be the 
agency to settle the global social policy code may seem at first sight victory for global 
social reform but the UN process giving as it does due weight to the south may lead to 
reducing the scope for global social regulation and also a set of polices that the 
Bank/IMF feels it can ignore. How to secure ‘positive conditionality’ by agreement 
rather than sanctions was an issue mentioned in the last chapter and will be returned to 
in the context of the EU’s LOME agreements below. 
Progress globally on injecting a social dimension into international trade 
agreements has been stymied by the same set of conflicts that now seem to be 
bedevilling the social regulation of capital flows. Attempts by the North to argue for 
common global labour and social standards in the context of trade have been perceived 
to be self interested attempts to protect the social welfare securities of people in 
developed countries from being undercut by competition from the South. These concerns 
of some southern governments have impacted upon the capacity of UN agencies to put 
their weight behind social policies’ of the kind that have ensured a degree of equity in 
developed welfare states. The impasse within the ILO where initial moves to argue for 
inserting social clauses into world trade agreements were derailed by a concerted 
campaign of some southern governments is illustrative of this. Reviewing the current 
situation with regard to this debate Eddy Lee of the ILO notes (Lee 1997, 177) ‘there is a 
deep fault line of distrust between industrialised and developing countries ... the existing 
system of international labour standards as it has evolved through the ILO has, willy-
nilly been caught in the cross-fire of this debate’. The positive aspect of the debate is the 
affirmation by all parties to support for what have come to be known as core labour 
standards. These are generally regarded to be those contained within conventions 29, 87, 
98, 100, 105,111, and 138 concerned with the prohibition of forced labour and child 
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labour, freedom of association and the right to organise and bargain collectively, equal 
remuneration for men and women for work of equal value, and non-discrimination in 
employment ’(Kyloh 1998). Lee recognise that for global progress to be made there is a 
need to link common standards with much more significant North-South resource 
transfers. ‘Industrialised countries should share part of this burden (of enabling 
developing countries to implement labour standards), since they also benefit from the 
reduction of these ‘international public bads’. In the case of child labour, for example, 
calls to eliminate it should be accompanied by aid to compensate children and families. 
This necessity of combining North- South trade with North-South aid in order 
to uphold global standards was mentioned in chapter two and will be returned to in the 
last chapter. All of this only serves to highlight that in terms of the debate about 
desirable social policies in the context of globalization the major location of the struggle 
of ideas is not only in the North between a European and an Anglo-Saxon perspective 
but also in the South between those who see a comparative advantage in exploiting the 
current absence of equitable social policy and those who do not. The discussions leading 
up to a possible ‘Millennium’ round of WTO negotiations set to begin in Seattle in 
November 1999 reveal these issues once again. Some socially concerned northern 
governments want to link labour standards and trade as does The International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU 1999). Many progressive southern voices do 
not want the connection made and are more concerned to prevent the incursion of the 
WTO into the new agenda being tabled by the USA, supported by the EU, of investment, 
competition policy and government procurement. (Khor 1998, 1999.) On the issue of 
preventing the incursion of the global free trade principle into government procurement 
there may be more common ground between progressives north and south. This will be 
addressed below.  
It is not only moves to increase global free trade that raise these social concerns 
but also the moves, temporarily halted by the opposition of a global network of civil 
society activists coupled with the strong objection of France and a few other countries, to 
reach through the OECD an agreement on multilateral investment (the MAI). Objection 
to the MAI was motivated, among other reasons, by the possible consequences for public 
government social provision or government subsidy to non profit providers of the right 
that would have been granted to private providers from other countries to challenge 
such public monopoly or public subsidy as unfair. (Clarke and Barlow 1998; Sanger 
1998.) The full range of health and social service, from child-care centres, not-for-profit 
hospitals and community clinics to private labs and independent physicians, would have 
been covered by the MAI investment obligations. The MAI rules governing the treatment 
of investors applied to a much broader range of health and social service than does the 
NAFTA investment chapter. Applying the MAI rules to grants and subsidies would have 
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considerably restricted the ability of national and provincial governments and regional 
authorities to manage and regulate health and social services by attaching conditions to 
the receipt of public money.  
The main pillar of the MAI was the prohibition against discriminatory 
treatment by one country of investors based in another country that is a party to the 
MAI. For example it would have entitled a foreign-based health or social services 
provider operating in Canada to receive public grants and subsidies on the same terms 
as a similar Canadian health care provider. Because the Canadian and American health 
care systems are so different it is not difficult to imagine the difficulties which would 
arise. Sanger goes on to argue that even a government setting out a reservation that such 
practices should not apply to their health and social services sector would have been full 
of holes. According to Sanger Canada’s proposed reservation read as follows: Canada 
reserves the right to adopt or maintain any measure with respect to the provision of public law 
enforcement and correctional services, and the following services to the extent that they are social 
services established or maintained for a public purpose: income security or insurance, social 
security or insurance, social welfare, public education, public training, health and child care. The 
protection for health and social services is highly qualified in this formulation. A 
program or other measure is protected only to the extent that it is a ‘social service 
established or maintained for a public purpose’.  
The MAI, like NAFTA, does not offer any interpretation of the meaning of 
terms ‘social service’ and ‘public purpose’. While no NAFTA dispute panel has ruled on 
an interpretation of these terms, the United States promotes an extremely restrictive 
meaning. The Canadian government asserts that the great majority of health and social 
services have a public purpose and so are covered by the reservation. However, the U.S. 
government asserts a much narrower interpretation. Guidelines issued by the United 
States Trade Representative state that: If private investors/service providers are permitted to 
supply services similar to those provided by a government (i.e. day care, drug treatment, law 
enforcement, social welfare, education, etc.), Chapter 11 [Investment] and Chapter 12 [Cross 
border trade in services] apply to the provision of those services. In other words, the view of 
the USTR is that the NAFTA rules apply to health care and other social services, in all 
cases where there is a mix of public and private funding or service delivery. If this 
interpretation prevailed in a dispute it would expose a large segment of Canada’s health 
care system to challenge by foreign commercial interests. It is reasonable to assume that 
the United States would assert the same narrow interpretation of this language should 
Canada’s proposed reservation be incorporated into any future variant of the MAI. 
Furthermore, several delegations to the MAI negotiations had been reportedly opposed 
to any ‘unbounded’ reservations which would apply to future measures. They insist that 
any reservation should be limited to existing measures, and be subject to the principles 
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of ‘standstill’ (which prohibits altering an existing measure to deviate further from MAI 
norms) and ‘rollback’ (which commits countries to progressively reduce the scope of any 
such reservation) (Sanger 1998). 
The issue will, as was noted above, resurface within the context of the Seattle 
meeting of the WTO. An examination of a recent background working paper by the 
Secretariat of the WTO Council for Trade in Services confirms this. (Koivusalo 1999). The 
document (WTO 1998) notes that the forthcoming round ‘offers members (of the WTO) 
to reconsider the breadth and depth of their commitments on health and social services, 
which are currently trailing behind other large sectors’. It notes with approval signs of an 
increased global trade in health care from developing to developed countries ‘with better 
off-people seeking rapid access to high-quality services abroad’. The document is 
exercised by the fact that under Article 1:3(c) of the GATS that services being provided in 
the exercise of governmental authority neither on a commercial basis nor in competition 
are excluded from free trade obligations. It goes on to note that ‘the coexistence of 
private and public hospitals may raise questions, however, concerning their competitive 
relationship and the applicability of the GATS.’ Indeed it argues that it is unrealistic to 
argue for the continued application of Article 1.3 to these situations. The most worrying 
aspect of this development is that discussions on this WILL take place. While there may 
be dispute about whether the new issues of investment, competition policy and 
government procurement are put onto the agenda of a big Millennium Round the issues 
of further trade in services and agriculture follow on from the existing WTO agreements.  
A further aspect of global economic activity where there have been moves to 
inject greater social responsibility is in the employment and social policy practices of 
TNCs. In order to prevent a possible race to the welfare bottom by TNCs exploiting the 
low labour and social standards of some countries it has been suggested that global 
TNCs should adopt the same standards of employment practice and submit themselves 
to the same levels of taxation wherever they invest. Systems of global production are 
replacing trade as the major means of international economic integration. The 
consequent trend towards arms-length commercial relationships including 
subcontracting within and across national borders challenges current regulatory norms. 
Such production processes have lead to a ‘slash and burn’ pattern of development as 
transnationals (TNCs) shift their sources of supply around the world in pursuit of the 
cheapest and least regulated labor force. One aspect of the globalization of production 
has been the growth in Export Processing Zones (EPZs). Evidence suggests that workers 
in the EPZs are often employed in conditions with little or no recognition of core labour 
standards and intimidation of workers who try to organize to defend their rights. 
(ICFTU 1998.) Campaigns by organized lobby groups and the international trade union 
movement have effectively utilized the media and electronic telecommunications to 
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highlight issues of co-operate social and environmental responsibility. Campaigns have 
been used to mobilize both consumers and shareholders and have operated across 
national boundaries. Companies, keen to avoid negative publicity that might effect their 
image and, ultimately, profitability, have had to respond. On 13th May 1998, Nike 
announced that they would no longer be hiring anyone under the age of 18. This acting 
was the result of shareholder demands in response to criticism leveled at Nike for its 
employment practices. There is emerging evidence also that firms which adopt codes of 
conduct are perceived as more efficient and are better supported by investors. (Sajhau 
1997.)  
 A key strategy has been to campaign for companies to adopt 'codes of conduct' 
which guarantee minimum labour standards throughout all the international operations 
of a company. In the absence of an enforceable international framework governing the 
operations of multinationals, pressing companies to adopt voluntary codes of conduct 
has become a major strategy for enforcing labour standards. The first major conference 
hosted by the UK based Ethical Trading Initiative took place in London at the end of 
1998. This brought together hundreds of people from a range of (large) companies, trade 
unions and NGOs to discuss fair trade issues and company codes of conduct. In the UK 
recent research has shown that six out of the nine UK companies in the top one hundred 
multinationals (ranked by foreign assets) currently have codes in draft (Ferguson 1998). 
Essentially the codes define minimum labour standards that the company, and 
significantly, all its subcontractors including those overseas, are expected to comply 
with. The contents of the different codes of course vary enormously but there has been a 
shift towards standardisation recently. The baseline code for the ETI to which over 15 
major UK companies have agreed is rooted in the ILO conventions. Thus this 
standardised code contains clauses on freedom of association, health and safety 
standards, child labour, hours of employment, discrimination etc. 
It is important to place the development of codes within the wider context of 
the rapid growth of the ethical business and fair trade movement. In the space of a few 
years, fairly traded products and the wider fair trade movement appear to have gone 
from the margins to the mainstream as a strategy for promoting labour rights in the global 
economy. During the past decade, there has been an enormous growth in the scope and 
presence of Fair Trade so that by 1995 the retail sales of fair trade goods was worth a 
quarter of a billion dollars in Europe alone. That is not to suggest there are no problems 
with the strategy of ethical trading. As the experience of the US apparel sector and the 
issue of child labour has shown, the demands of the ethical consumer do not always 
promote actions which are in the best interests of southern workers. In response to 
public outcry in the US about the use of children in sweatshop conditions, a number of 
companies, such as Levi’s, introduced codes which included provisions banning the use 
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of child labour in their production processes. Cutting child labour out of the supply 
chain entailed a lesser risk of negative publicity than trying to improve their labour 
conditions. The evidence suggests that, as a result of companies’ actions, there has been a 
decrease in the use of child labour in garment industries exporting to the US. In the 
absence of alternative sources of reliable income, this outcome has not necessarily been 
in the best interests of all working children in southern countries. Codes of conduct are 
supposed to address the demands of the northern consumer, NGOs, the company 
shareholder and the southern worker.  
Where these claims conflict, it has, in some cases, been the interests of the 
southern workers which have suffered. Companies respond to the consumer’s demand 
for immediate action rather than the worker’s need for gradual improvements. In order 
to be effective, codes have to be constructed and implemented in a way which 
surmounts these contradictions and addresses the needs of the least powerful. There is a 
danger too that the introduction of codes in export industries will exacerbate the 
difference in conditions between the those in this sector and other workers, with the 
most vulnerable workers being pushed out of the better paid and regulated export 
industries. 
Finally there is the question of global tax regulation and global revenue raising. 
A number of concerns consequent upon globalization are evident as far as OECD 
countries are concerned. A race to the welfare bottom is feared because any social 
programmes whose costs fall upon capital may not be fundable when capital has the 
option of relocating to a country or zone with lower tax rates. Equally it is suggested that 
taxes on labour, or at least pay roll taxes that fall directly upon firms will be discouraged 
in the same way as investors will look to countries where the total cost of labour is 
cheap. There are of-course traditional arguments against the worst case scenario. Some 
aspects of social spending even if they fall upon capital are beneficial to capital. 
Improved worker productivity, increased social and political stability are goods as far as 
long term investment is concerned. Equally there are reasons why some fixed capital is 
better located near the market for the products so that capital flight may not be so 
extensive as feared. The trends in taxation and in social spending in developed 
economies suggest that while globalization is beginning to exercise some constraints on 
taxation policy this is far from overwhelming. Equally there continues to be distinct 
patterns of difference among the wish and the capacity of governments to provide for 
social protection measures in the context of globalization. Within the OECD area 
government expenditure increased from just under 30 per cent of GDP in 1960 to a 1995 
level of nearly 50 %. Over half of this increase has been due to increases in social 
transfers which increased from 9 % of GDP to 20 % (OECD 1998: DEELSA/ELSA/MIN 
(98)3). The reconciliation of this increased expenditure with the commitments to 
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balanced budgets described earlier has been achieved by increased taxation. The ratio of 
taxes to GDP across the OECD area has increased since 1985. However at the same time a 
number of countries have during this period cut aspects of social spending to balance the 
books.  
Among the trends in the form of taxation that have been levied are the 
following: a) Reduction in the share of taxation falling on capital income (Rodrik 1997), 
b) Increase in the share of taxation falling on labour income (Rodrik 1997), c) Pressures 
increasingly evident to reduce payroll taxation to stimulate low wage employment 
(Scharf 1998), d) A reduction in the marginal rate of income taxation so that the burden 
of taxation is falling more on lower earners, e) Concern that a limit may have been 
reached in taxation on incomes and consumption, i.e. on labour income (OECD 1998). 
Associated with this is the emergence of a global market in skilled and professional 
labour seeking out low tax rates, e) Experiments with new forms of eco-friendly taxation 
(O’Roirdan 1997). The double dividend available from eco-taxation would appear to 
create a common interest between those who wish to defend the tradition of high 
taxation and high spending welfare states and those who want to protect the 
environment in the context of globalization. ‘The most comprehensive proposal for 
reform is to shift taxes from taxing employment to taxing pollution and other 
environmental damage. Although the idea is in its infancy, initial studies are promising. 
An OECD study for Norway suggests that a revenue-neutral shift of this sort might 
reduce unemployment by one percentage point while substantially reducing 
environmental damage’ (UNDP 1998, 100) This strategy of shifting to environmental 
taxation would, however, require a measure of cross border agreement and in that sense 
is no different from measures that would be required at the global level to reach 
agreement on levels of corporate taxation that applied everywhere.  
The drift caused by globalization to taxes on labour income which are 
perceived to have reached the limits of viability can only be reversed and taxation on 
capital income increased by international agreement worked out under the authority of a 
new global tax authority. Steps are being taken within the EU to harmonise corporate tax 
rates but opposition to this from the UK is fed by the absence of any such global 
agreement. Such agreement may also be needed on rates of labour and consumption 
taxation. In this context it is encouraging to note that the Social Policy and Social 
Development secretariat of the UN have tabled as possible action agenda items for the 
Copenhagen plus 5 process the need to contain tax competition (UN 1999a). The first 
PrepCom in New York which ended on May 28th was however a long way from 
reaching agreement on the concrete steps to be taken in June 2000. It will fall to the 
Finnish and then the Portuguese EU Presidency to keep the momentum up towards 
seeing this as a step which requires global action.   
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In terms of not only trying to limit the speculative flow of short term capital 
but also in terms of raising global revenue for global social purposes the TOBIN tax 
remains an important proposal along with others such as a tax on air line travel 
(Cassimom 1999). It has been suggested (Kaul and Langmore 1996) that all of the 
revenue arising from transaction in poor countries should be retained by them but some 
of the revenues arising from transactions in richer countries should be remitted to a new 
global spending authority under UN auspices. Scheduled for 2001 is a high level UN 
conference on Finance for Development which might just be the place where a version of 
the TOBIN tax is given serious intergovernmental consideration as a means of taking 
further the Copenhagen plus 5 resolutions to meet specific development targets. The 
positive impact on social welfare north and south would be to: 
 Ensure the meeting of the current OECD:DAC targets of securing basic education 
and health services as well as water, sanitation and shelter to ALL the world’s 
citizens, and enable the targets to be realistically extended to secondary education 
and hospital care. (Chapter five.) 
 Shift the balance of power globally back to the UN from the World Bank and the IMF 
which in turn would lead to the erosion of the ideology of privatisation and 
residualisation in public welfare provision. 
 Encourage global demand management and an element of global Keynesianism 
which would have a positive impact on growth globally and which, in turn, is a 
better environment within which to continue the struggle to find a north-south 
compromise on global labour, social and health standards. 
 Contribute, through the positive impact all of this would have on egalitarianism 
within and between countries, to the erosion of all of those public global bads that 
stem from global inequity. These include aspects of international crime and drug 
running, illegal economic migration, and environmental degradation. 
 Provide resources to turn the emerging global code of best practice on social policy 
with its associated conception of a set of global social rights into reality. (Chapter 
four.) 
 
The EU’s role: Concern with the social dimension of Europe or the world? 
 
To what extent and it what ways has Europe either in terms of the role of EU and 
Parliament or in terms of the intergovernmental process under the EU Presidency 
contributed to these concerns, namely; the regulation of global financial flows, injecting a 
social dimension into trade negotiations, addressing the issue of public social services in 
the context of the MAI and its successor, ensuring TNCs adopt a socially responsible 
code of practice, and handling issues of international tax harmonisation and 
international revenue raising? We review each of these in turn. 
When we address the issue of the social regulation of the global economy by 
the IMF and the World Bank we are faced with a problem from the point of view of a 
coherent EU contribution. The EU does not exist as an entity in either bodies. Countries 
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are grouped within the World Bank voting system in ways which do not conform to the 
EU as a bloc. Nordic countries vote together for example. While it may have been the 
case that one of the reasons for the last Development Committee of the Bank (April 27th 
1999) agreeing to shift responsibility for the global code of best practice in social policy 
from the Bank to the UN was the view of some European countries that this was 
appropriate it hardly counts as direct EU influence. As we saw in chapter four the 
influence for this decision came more from the south’s concern with social conditionality. 
The fact that it has now passed to the UN pre Copenhagen plus 5 process means that 
through the system of electronic intergovernmental exchanges, the associated meetings 
overseen by the Presidency and the subsequent Prepatory Committee caucus meetings in 
New York a common EU view on the global code will emerge.  
This shift of the principles of social policy to the UN forum from the Bank is 
against the trend. The more issues of global social policy have become the province of 
the Bretton Woods organisations the less chance for influence directly by the EU or the 
Commission. Moves are being considered for a closer professional secretariat 
relationship between the Commission and the Social Protection Section of the World 
Bank. This could lead to increased European influence on bank social policy as was 
observed when the bank needed to recruit new European staff to handle their social 
sector activities in Eastern Europe (Deacon et al 1997). Indirectly, of course the EU by its 
attendance in the shape of the Presidency as well by the full presence of the UK, France, 
Germany and Italy at G7 meetings of Finance Ministers permits of a potential 
considerable leverage on global financial policy. None- the- less the Council of Ministers 
at the recent Vienna Council expressed concern about the adequacy of this indirect route 
to influence and expressed the view ‘that it was imperative that the Council should play 
its full part in international monetary and financial affairs’. It called for the full 
participation of the President of ECOFIN assisted by the Commission at G7 finance 
meetings. However the greater attention paid to ways to increase global employment 
within the G7 forum recently has been influenced by EU thinking. As a location for the 
Anglo-Saxon and European debate about the desirability of liberal or Keynesian broad 
macro economic strategies these G7 meetings which feed into the Bank and the Fund’s 
deliberations are important. On the matter of how the global financial crisis might be 
managed there is no one single European as distinct from G7 position (UNDP 1998). 
Blair had talked of a new IMF for a new Millennium. Lafontaine had talked of target 
zones for the world trading currencies etc. The EC Commissioner for Economic, 
Monetary and Financial Affairs, speaking at the 27th April meeting of the Interim 
Committee of the IMF argued for the adoption of codes ‘such as the one on good 
practices on Transparency in Monetary and Financial Policies’ but he did not mention 
the social dimension of this in the speech. 
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The policy of the European Union with regard to linking social concerns 
including labour standards with the freeing of trade has shifted over time and shifts 
according to whether the focus is the WTO or regional trade agreements. At certain key 
times such as the Singapore Ministerial meeting in December 1996 to consider the future 
agenda of the WTO different EU countries have found themselves taking quite divergent 
views. The EU spoke through the medium of the EC with one voice in the establishment 
of the trade agreements that gave rise to the WTO. The slow pace at which European 
agriculture would be exposed to competition through tariff reductions on foreign food 
imports was one of the ‘achievements’ of the EU in the face of the general call for 
reduced tariffs which the EU supported. Before the 1996 Singapore meeting the EU 
proposed that there should be a working party of the WTO to examine the link between 
trade and labour standards. While this communication from the Commission (COM (96) 
402) linked the two it stressed that EU policy was not to use a social clause as a sanction 
against developing countries but free trade should help achieve a global raising of 
standards and adherence to core ones. The meeting itself found the UK allied with other 
neo-liberal governments, authoritarian Indonesia, anti Imperialist India actively 
opposing any link. European social democratic governments and the USA pushed for a 
link. The neo-liberal view prevailed.  
In preparation for the 2000 round of trade negotiations the EU seem to have 
decided not to raise the issue again. The note prepared for the EU trade Minister’s 
Informal Meeting on 9-10 May 1999 suggests only that ‘The Community and its Member 
States should continue to press for more progress within the ILO on the observance of 
core labour standards ... enhanced co-operation between the WTO and the ILO 
secretariats, which respects the distinctive rules and competencies of each institution, 
should also be pursued in line with the Singapore declaration’. This position reflects a 
rather unhappy compromise between those who are actually not in favour of linking the 
two issues and those who would want to but are sensitive to the opposition of some 
southern countries to the link. Clearer links between trade and environmental 
considerations are however envisaged. The opinion of the European Economic and 
Social Committee on the WTO (CES 66/99 D/HO/CH/ym/ht/ss) ‘calls upon the EC to 
stipulate that the participation of the EU in the next round of negotiations shall be 
conditional upon… application of environmental and labour standards more widely’.  
On the matter of increasing the scope for opening the market in services within 
the existing WTO agreements and of pushing for a new Millennium Round which would 
encompass investment, competition policy and government procurement the EU stands 
alongside the USA. The Commission (European Commission 1999b) seems to see only 
advantage in this in expanding its business in developing countries. Any potential threat 
to government public social service provision within the EU from private health and 
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social care providers in the USA or elsewhere is not articulated. The preparations by the 
EU for the new round of negotiations are dominated by trade Ministers. There is an 
urgent need to bring Ministers of Development and of Social Policy into the frame of 
negotiations.  
In terms of its bilateral trade relations the EU has however linked trade and 
standards. Countries fall into one of three categories from the point of view of access to 
EU trade. Most have access via the generalised system of preferences which provides 
some quota limited tariff free trade and some differential tariff arrangements. Second 
and these are the USA, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Australia Taiwan who have most-
favoured nation (MFN) status. Only one, North Korea has less than MFN status. Within 
the generalised system of preferences tariff barriers could be reduced for products 
‘manufactured in conditions conforming to standards laid down by the ILO’. In 1998 the 
legislation was reformed to provide additional special incentive arrangements for those 
countries who applied and furnished proof of conforming to conventions concerning the 
right to organise and the minimum age of employment (DOC 396R1256). The Economic 
and Social Council in the opinion on the WTO mentioned above have bemoaned the 
limited uptake of this carrot approach to standards. The Parliament have voted on first 
reading (2/7/98) for a system of fair trade with developing countries which would 
create a common European fair trade label for imported goods which conformed to a 
number of conditions attached to production. These links of trade with standards are, of 
course complimented within the LOME agreements for the ACP countries with aid 
arrangements which we discussed in chapter five designed at least in part to facilitate 
conformity with the standards by making adherence to human rights an element of the 
agreements. Studies have been critical of how far this policy has worked in practice 
(Faber and Roelfsema 1997).  
In terms of the future of LOME which is now being re-negotiated it would 
appear that the Commission has the job of balancing its tradition, albeit limited, of giving 
preferences for conformity with labour standards in its regional bilateral trading 
agreements to its position with respect to the WTO that presence or absence of such 
standards should not be a basis for trade sanctions. In terms of the stated Commission 
position at the start of the new negotiations it is asserted that the reduction of poverty 
shall be at the heart of the new ACP-EU relations. The Commission’s Green Paper (1997) 
on the future suggested support for growth in ACP countries through integration in 
trade, support by aid for social policies, and enhanced regionalisation would facilitate 
this. The EC negotiating brief for LOME (Lecomte 1998) provides for the idea of 
replacing the non-reciprocal trade preferences by reciprocal ones with aid compensating 
for ACP countries opening their markets to EC products. This move should take place on 
a regional basis so that ACP countries form among themselves and the EU regional 
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trading blocs, for example SADC. For the least developed ACPs they should retain their 
existing LOME privileges, but as Lecomte (1998) notes in the context of the WTO 
discrimination in the form of preferences would slowly loose their value. This only 
serves to point to the need for the EU to revise its negotiating mandate at Seattle and 
give greater priority to the place and value of non-reciprocal trade arrangements 
between countries that are at a different level of development.  
Another way, as we saw in the last section, of raising global labour and allied 
standards was to move towards a code of conduct for TNCs to adopt and to implement 
where ever they invested. European moves on this seem to range from the very tentative 
in terms of the Commission and rather more radical in terms of proposals emanating 
from Parliament. At the beginning of 1998 DG 5 hosted a symposium on Codes of 
Conduct and International Labour Standards at which Padraig Flynn spoke. Little 
appears to have followed from this on a European level in terms of work either by DG 5 
or by DG 8 to match the ethical trading initiative described earlier in the case of the UK 
and supported by UK DFID. On the other hand MEP Richard Howitt of the Parliaments 
Development Committee obtained a first reading on 15/01/99 for a resolution which 
called for the establishment of a compulsory code of practice incorporating respect for 
human rights, labour rights and environmental standards which would apply to all EU 
based TNCs. This would be overseen by a European Monitoring Platform made up of 
NGOs etc. Such a regulation should be linked to investment agreements as part of the 
new ACP deal. The Parliament agreed to an evolutionary approach whereby an initial 
voluntary code would give way to a compulsory one in time (European Parliament 
1999). 
Finally what is the EU position in terms of international tax policy as a 
contribution to ensuring the maintenance of public social expenditures in an era of 
competition? The issue has become a matter of some controversy within Europe not in 
terms of what to do globally but in terms of what to do about possible damaging tax 
competition within Europe. The Commission proposed a comprehensive review of 
taxation policy in March 1996. Initial work was done by a high level group appointed by 
the ECOFIN Council Ministers. Their deliberations were reported in late 1996 (COM (96) 
546). While there was some acknowledgement that the pressure on labour taxes needed 
to be addressed there was no agreement on alternative forms of taxation such as 
consumption taxes or eco taxes. For some the solution lay in cutting expenditures. 
Considerable differences in the rates of tax on business were observed but no agreement 
emerged on a minimum. So far in practice customs taxes are of course fully harmonised, 
excise duties are not. There is a minimum rate with exceptions and common bands on 
VAT. In the area of savings taxes, corporate taxation and income taxation there was no 
harmonisation. The Finance Ministers discussed the issue again in December 1997 and 
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adopted a resolution on a code of conduct for business taxation. The Commission 
proposed a directive on cross border interest payments to individuals on May 20th 1998 
and one on interest payments between companies on March 4th 1998. The issue took on 
a much more explosively controversial form in the wake of the election of a number of 
social democratic parties to power in Europe in 1998. The recommendations that moves 
needed to be taken to harmonise taxation policy within Europe made by the Party of 
European Socialist’s Working Group on taxation was taken up by the Social Democratic 
Finance Ministers meeting in late 1998. An uproar took place in the UK press with 
Lafontaine branded the most dangerous man in Europe and Britain insisting it would 
use the veto on taxation provided for within the Treaty. None-the-less French and 
German Ministers felt the beginnings of a tax code for Europe would be ready by the end 
of the German Presidency. 
 The acrimony within Europe resulting from the coexistence inside Europe of 
those governments who see a benefit in the context of global competition for investment 
from having low taxes and those who see the need to harmonise to prevent this 
competition driving EU countries apart can probably only be solved if the EU takes also 
an outward looking view on this and considers its contribution to common global tax 
standards. There is little sign that this is happening. An email response to an enquiry 
about EU work on the TOBIN tax to the Commission simply said ... ’for the moment 
there is not much work being done on this issue’ . 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: EUROPE’S CONTRIBUTION TO A SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE 
GLOBALIZATION 
 
The Commission of the European Union asserted the importance of globalization as a 
challenge to Europe in the preface to its work programme for 1999 (COM604). ‘These 
objectives (of the Commission) were set against the backdrop of the fundamental 
challenges confronting the European Union in a changing world. One of these challenges 
is that of globalization, bringing growing interdependence, global circulation of 
information and the emergence of a world-wide market for trade and production ...  
concerted regulatory efforts will have to be made in order to limit the negative effects of 
this phenomena’. The document also asserted that ‘The European Union must be capable 
of exercising political responsibilities on the international scene to match its economic 
and commercial stature. In order to mobilise its full potential, the Union should not only 
promote an approach which integrates the various aspects of its external action to a 
greater extent but also exploits the links between its internal and external policies’. 
Finally it asserted ‘The Commission will also seek to ensure greater coherence in its 
human rights policy, a vital component of the relationship between the Union and the 
rest of the world’. We began this booklet with the cry of Martin and his co-authors that 
‘A European Union truly worthy of its name could insist that tax havens be cleared, 
demand the enforcement of minimum social and ecological standards, and raise a 
turnover tax on the capital and currency trade’. This final chapter attempts a summary 
evaluation of the European Union against both of these statements.  
 
The impact of globalization:summary 
 
The impact of globalization upon the social dimension of Europe can be summarised 
from the material in chapter two as follows. 
 Globalization does represent a challenge to aspects of the social policy of Europe but 
this can be overstated. 
 The challenge is as much in terms of the ideology of liberalisation associated with 
globalization by some of its proponents as it is an inevitable consequence of 
globalization per se. 
 Different countries of Europe find their social policy and social provision affected 
differently because of the financing bases of their programmes. 
 Social provisions funded from labour taxation are most challenged by globalization. 
Citizenship based taxation and provision are, if the political will is there, most 
sustainable as an alternative if the other option of residualisation and privatisation is 
to be resisted. 
 No coherent and systematic response to the challenges of globalization to the social 
dimension of Europe by the Union as a whole can be detected. The EU response to 
globalization has varied in time and in policy area. 
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 The responses to globalization have embraced accommodation to the liberalising 
agenda of globalization, inclinations towards social protectionism, a concern to assert 
the importance of human but not often social rights globally, concern with the social 
dimension of enlargement and attempts to link trade and aid and social standards in 
relation to bilateral trade. 
 In the area of employment policy, particularly, the EU has made constructive 
contribution to a transatlantic and global discourse. 
 A lack of overall policy coherence in terms of responding to globalization has led to 
intergovernmental controversy on related questions such as tax policy. 
 
The contribution of the EU to a socially responsible globalization:summary 
An assessment, therefore of the actual contribution of Europe to a socially responsible 
globalization has to be a mixed one.  
 The contribution of different elements of the EU institutional structure is different. 
 The Parliament has often resolved polices which appear to go furthest in the 
direction of embodying the idea of a socially responsible globalization but it is not 
burdened yet with the job of seeing these through. 
 The Commission attempts to juggle the defence of Europe’s particular interests with 
a concern about global human rights. 
 The Economic and Social Committee articulates concerns about globalization but 
often tinged with a protectionist colour. 
 The intergovernmental process has led to coherent EU contributions concerning the 
social dimension of globalization in some fora such as the Commission on Social 
Development but has generated unproductive controversy in others. 
 The common foreign and security policy of the Union is fashioned by a dated 
conception of foreign policy and has not yet been able to integrate an external 
dimension of EU social policy as part of its brief. 
 In a number of arenas and policy areas where steps are being taken internationally to 
fashion a social responsible globalization the Union is certainly not at the forefront of 
debate. 
 The move to fashion a global set of social rights which might be embodied in the 
emerging global guidelines of best practice in social policy owes little to the EU. 
 Although the EU contributes a large proportion of international aid its development 
policy lags behind that of other actors in terms of a focused concern with global 
inequality. This in turn means it is not in a position to enter the debate about whether 
targeting the poor abroad contradicts the more universalistic social policy approaches 
operating within Europe.  
 Little appears to be being contributed by the Commission at this stage to debates 
about global taxation policy or moves to socially regulate TNCs.  
 The new initiative to reopen MAI type discussion within the context of the WTO does 
not appear to be informed by the potential negative impacts of multilateral 
investment on European governmental responsibility for health and social services.  
 While exercised by the relationship between free trade and labour and social 
standards globally new policy initiatives on this seem to be off the agenda of the EU 
as a whole because of intergovernmental disagreement, a fondness for global 
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liberalisation on the part of the Commission and an uncertainty about how to 
proceed in these matters in the wake of Singapore.  
 All of the above not withstanding there are a number of policy initiatives or existing 
practices of the EU which would form the basis of a more socially responsible 
approach. These include the linking of aid to ACP countries with attempts to raise 
social standards in the context of trade concessions which privilege countries that 
conform to ILO and other standards. Also to be mentioned here are Parliamentary 
moves to compel European TNCs to adopt a code of practice with regard to their 
investments outside Europe. In a similar vein is the concern of the Commission to 
ensure that social policy developments in Eastern Europe aspire to European 
standards. 
 Individual countries within the EU have made significant contributions to the global 
debate about how to respond to globalization with a social concern. Because of its 
special position in relation to both the USA and Europe the British government does 
seem to be pivotal here. Its initiatives on a global social policy code, in ethical 
trading, in pushing the OECD:DAC targets to the front of the global aid agenda are 
important. The question for Europe is how these sit alongside the UK’s 
accommodation with globalization. Does the third way as articulated from within the 
UK represent a renewal of social democratic values and practices refashioned for a 
global era or does it represent too much of a concession to the global liberal agenda? 
 
The table below captures some of the ways in which EU policy embodies a progressive 
response to globalization in terms of the six steps towards a socially responsible 
globalization that were listed in chapter two. The table also suggests a more ideal 
contribution that might have been expected from the EU. 
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Figure 7.1 The contribution of the EU to a socially responsible globalization 
 
Step towards a socially 
responsible globalization 
EU contribution 
at present 
Possible future 
 contribution 
From Human rights to 
Social rights: From 
declaration to 
implementation 
 
 
Human rights dimension of 
common foreign and security 
policy 
 
 
 
 
Social rights to be included explicitly 
both for EU citizens and as a goal 
elsewhere   
 
EU to establishes as a model a court 
of social rights. (Luxembourg Court 
of Justice?) 
International 
development Co-
operation: from setting 
goals to monitoring 
progress 
 
 
EU aid policy is not focused 
on the poorest and 
policy for poverty alleviation 
lacks coherence. 
Better focus on poorer countries but 
with critical approach to  
OECD:DAC targets on only basic 
services. 
Desirability of universalism at all 
levels of health and education to be 
emphasised 
Moves to secure global 
minimum labour , social 
and health standards  
For minimum global labour 
standards but opposed to 
social protectionism. 
 
 
Bilateral trade preferences for 
meeting labour and social 
standards. 
 
Concern with public health 
in context of  trade policy 
Greater resolve to strengthen ILO 
capacity to enforce common labour 
standards within context of WTO 
policy. 
 
Injection of public health and  social 
environmental issues into WTO 2000 
round. 
 
The moves to establish 
codes of practice for 
socially responsible 
investment and business 
 
Discussion forum only so far 
plus Parliamentary call for 
legal obligation to follow a 
code with effective  
monitoring 
Obligatory codes and monitoring not 
only for EU based TNCs. 
The calls for global 
economic regulation and 
global taxation 
 
 
No common EU position Support through Copenhagen plus 5 
a  global social policy code which is 
orientated to universalistic and high 
level social provision. 
 
Support a TOBIN or similar tax. 
 
Support for a strengthened UN role 
in global economic and social policy. 
The moves to extend 
constructive regionalism 
with a social dimension 
 
EU-MERCUSOR dialogue 
EU-ASEAN dialogue 
 
Association and co-operation 
agreements and social 
dimension of accession 
process. 
 
LOME negotiations aimed at 
Greater attention to social dimension 
in all inter-regional discussions. 
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regionalisation 
The impact of the social policy for Europe on the external dimension of EU social 
policy: summary 
 
There are many actors in the process of shaping EU policy and impacting on its external 
social dimension. How far has EU internal social policy shaped its external dimension? 
How far, in the words of the Commission’s own Social Action Programme for 1998-2000 
(COM (1998) 259) has the internal social policy of the EU enabled the EU to ‘play an 
important role in promoting social progress on the world stage’? This might be an 
opportune moment to make this assessment as the promised communication on the 
external dimension of its work has been delayed. 
 From all of the foregoing a check list of where EU internal social policy has and 
has not impacted upon aspects of EU’s external policy may be provided. In sum it 
appears as follows. 
 In terms of the position of the EU in the world economy as a trading bloc it is the case 
that the relationship of EU internal social policy to this external environment has 
been one where the external forces shaped internal social policy rather than the other 
way round. The concern to privilege labour market policy within the Commission 
and the moves towards supporting flexible work and positive labour market policy 
were part of this. However this study has shown that the Commission is now 
becoming more assertive externally in terms of affecting the transatlantic dialogue 
within the G7. It is beginning to argue that it is possible to combine employment with 
high social standards. 
 In terms of trade policy the internal social policy of the EU influenced the 
Commission before the the Singapore WTO meeting when an attempt was made to 
link trade and global social and labour standards but since the impasse between the 
North and South on this issue is now taking a back seat. It continues to support the 
link of trade and standards in bilateral trade. 
 There is no sign of initiatives from the Commission to address systematically the 
possible impact on government responsibility for social provision of the moves to 
renew negotiations on international investment. Indeed the Commission appears to 
be leading the moves to reopen this agenda.. 
 In terms of EU Development policy there is no sign of the internal social policy 
impacting on development policy. The exception to this is in relation to ‘development 
policy’ towards Eastern Europe and the NIS where, rather late in the day, the 
Commission is now attempting to assert the importance of the social dimension of 
enlargement. 
 The internal dimension of the EU’s social policy does not seem to have had the 
impact of raising social rights further up the agenda of the human rights aspect of the 
common foreign and security policy.  
 
The relatively low influence of internal social policy on these external matters should be 
no surprise as it reflects the reality on a national basis of the pecking order of the 
Minister of Social Policy compared to the Minister of Foreign Policy, the Minister of 
 - 74 - 
 
Finance and Economics, the Minister of Trade etc. While of no surprise it is of concern if 
the argument developed in chapter one and two is correct that social (including labour, 
health and human rights issues) along with environmental issues are now becoming the 
most important dimensions of global politics. 
 
Recommendations for improved EU global intervention: summary 
 
What changes are required if the goal is to ensure that the European Union as a Union is 
to make a more effective intervention in the dynamics of globalization such that the 
process of globalization takes the social dimension more seriously? From the analysis 
above reform proposals emerge at several levels. Changes are required in the 
Constitution of the EU as shaped by the treaty, in policy both at a very general level and 
in a number of areas, and in process. New initiatives are needed.  
 
Constitutional changes 
 
 A key obstacle to the EU’s social dimension being raised further up the European’s 
Union’s Foreign policy is the conceptualisation of foreign policy embodied within the 
treaty framework. It has not caught up with the new global realities where social, 
health, environmental and allied issues are the key issues in global politics. This 
needs addressing in the next intergovernmental conference where revisions to 
Amsterdam are on the agenda. At the same time the formulation of the CFSP needs 
to be informed by all directorates within the Commission and not least by DG 5. The 
existence of the concern with human rights within the existing CFSP does provide an 
opportunity to raise the issue of global social rights higher in the profile of the EU’s 
external concerns.  
 Giving greater scope for Parliamentary scrutiny and shaping of policy, if the existing 
political composition of the Parliament does not change radically, would also 
advance a social dimension to the EU’s external policy. 
 
Policy changes (general) 
 
 At a general level what is required is the formulation of a clearer and more consistent 
European policy towards the negative social consequences of globalization which 
treads a path between a relapse into protectionism and an accommodation with 
liberal globalization. If agreement could be reached on this at a high inter-
governmental level then the prospects for the EU speaking with one strong voice in 
favour of a socially responsible globalization would be greater.  
 Similarly there is the need for greater policy coherence across the diverse dimensions 
of EU policy. Internal discussions about tax harmonisation make no sense unless they 
are linked to discussions in the G7 about global financial regulation, or, in turn linked 
to discussions about internal social policy. Policy formulation for the WTO round 
and any resurrected MAI cannot sensibly proceed without rigorous examination of 
the links between policy in these fields and the EU’s health and social policies.  
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 Internal and external social, health, and environmental impact assessments need to 
be routinely built into policy formulation in trade, economic and development policy 
and other areas. 
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Policy changes (specific) 
 
 EU international development co-operation should focus on reducing global 
inequities and reducing poverty through increased aid to develop universalistic 
approaches to social provision not only at basic level but also, in time, all levels. 
 EU international trade policy both bilateral and multilateral should aim to couple 
raised social and labour standards with trade policy by means of effective 
international aid geared to enabling countries to raise standards with the support of 
the ILO and WHO etc. Agreements are needed with developing countries that trade 
carrots for improved labour and social policies combined with consumer awareness 
campaigns via social (green) labelling of imports are desirable. 
 EU policy towards the regulation of global financial flows should include support for 
a code of best practice in global social policy informed by best practice in European 
social policy. 
 EU policy towards international capital flows should include support for a global 
regulatory tax authority and a global revenue raising process such as via a Toxin tax. 
Any new international investment agreement to be shaped to conserve the possibility 
of government provision for social, health and education above any globally agreed 
minimum in ways which are not subject to challenge by foreign investors.      
 At the same time the EU should work towards a mandatory code of labour and social 
practice to be followed by TNCs. EU pension funds to be subject in their investment 
policies to these same regulations. 
 EU humanitarian assistance to be provided in ways which maximise the capacity of 
the recipient government agencies improving their own capacity to provide social 
protection in the aftermath of the crisis. 
 DG 5 to give urgent priority to working with DG 1A on the establishment of a bill of 
social rights for all EU residents. These rights, in due course to be subject to 
individual appeal to the ECJ. This bill then to be the basis of the developmental goal 
of EU aid policy. 
 
Process changes 
 
 More priority to be given to the interservices liaison processes within the 
Commission, 
 The institutional memory of EU’s social policy interventions at the UN, ILO,WHO 
and indirectly at G7 needs to be strengthened. This would ensure a greater 
transparency and consistency between EU positions emerging in these fora via the 
intergovernmental process and EU social policy. 
 The phrase ‘safety net’ should be dropped from the EU lexicon and be replaced with 
the phrase ‘systems of social protection’. 
 The Labour and Social Council of Ministers and the Council of Health Ministers to 
more regularly reflect on the social impacts both internally and externally of EU 
policy emerging in other councils especially trade and finance.    
 Specific guidance be given on EU social policy and EU external social and 
development policy to all INGOs and consulting companies who are subcontracted 
to implement EU technical assistance or aid.  
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Initiatives 
 
 A key task for the coming period across Europe is to bring the thinking of Social 
Policy experts in Ministries of Social Affairs to bear on the practice of Trade 
Ministers, of Aid Ministers of Finance Ministries and of Foreign Ministers. Direction 
in practice is actually going in the opposite direction at present. Foreign Ministries 
and Trade Ministries are seeking advice on social standards issues from a range of 
consulting companies who have no necessary allegiance to the social policy of the 
country within which they operate or to EU social policy. The current impact of EU 
social policies on external relations policies tends therefore at best to be patchy. There 
is even a danger that trade, and foreign policy interests will come to shape EU 
internal social policies. A case exists for a European wide seminar which would 
discuss the links between trade, aid, and social policy. The point would be to 
encourage cross Ministerial discussions of these issues among higher level civil 
servants within countries and in the Commission in the company of scholars and 
civil society.  
 The following processes are reaching an important stage during the end of 1999.  
 
i) The EU mandate for the WTO negotiations must be settled; 
                    
ii) The review by the Development Council of  EU development policy 
will  begin to be formulated; 
 
iii) The EU position with regard to the Copenhagen plus 5 agenda 
including global principles of best practice in social policy and their 
financing will be shaped; 
 
iv) The legacy of the German Presidency to develop a code of social rights 
for EU citiazens will need to be followed through. 
 
If the recommendations of this little book are accepted then such a policy coherence will 
be forged not with a view to accomodating all EU policies to neo-liberal globalization but 
with a view to ensuring all EU policies, in keeping with the social dimension of the EU, 
are geared to the task of replacing a neo-liberal globalization with a socially responsible 
globalization.  
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